INDO-US RELATIONS
An Update
It would be unfair and ungenerous even on the part of the
critics of the present Government in New Delhi to deny that in its handling of the
process of re-adjustment of Indo-US relations after the Pokhran-II nuclear tests, it has
succeeded, to some extent, in imparting to the relations a certain dignity and equality
which were previously lacking.
This should be obvious to anyone, whose sense of fairness and objectivity had not been
weakened by prejudices against the present Government, after the recently-concluded eighth
round of talks at New Delhi between Jaswant Singh, India’s Minister for
External Affairs, and Strobe Talbott, the US Deputy Secretary of State.
There has been some confusion in New Delhi and Washington after the talks on the nature
and timing of what a member of the US delegation has described as the mutually-reinforcing
(he avoided using the phrase quid pro quo in view of its negative connotation in India)
steps on which the two delegations reportedly agreed in order to give the bilateral
relations a forward-looking momentum instead of continuing to remain mired in Pokhran of
May,1998.
In their non-attributable-by-name briefings for journalists in New Delhi, members of the
US delegation have conveyed the impression that these steps would consist of a definitive
commitment by India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on a date earlier
than September,1999, and US support for the World Bank funding of a
power project in Andhra Pradesh.
While this impression is yet to be categorically confirmed by spokesmen of the Government
of India, spokesmen of the State Department and the White House in Washington seem to have
gone out of their way in dampening any undue expectations from India that a lifting of the
economic sanctions was round the corner.
They have been underlining in their open briefings of journalists in Washington that while
the recent round in New Delhi was more positive than the preceding ones, it would be
premature to talk of a consequent break-through in Indo-US relations.
In a presentation on “ Pokhran II : International Response” at the Centre For
South-East Asian Studies of the University of Madras in August, 1998, (subsequently
published in full by the “Indian Defence Review” of Lancer
Publications,July-Sept,1998, Vol 13-3), this writer had drawn attention to the three
voices with which Washington seemed to be talking to India—a voice of moderation and
reasonableness emanating from Talbott and his deputy Karl Inderfurth, a voice of
impatience and even virulence from Madeleine Albright, the Secretary of State, and her
spokesman James Rubin, and the voice of the White House, which was reflecting sometimes
the moderation of Talbott and sometimes the virulence of Albright.
This cacophony of reactions and assessments from Washington has since weakened, but not
yet substantially. The virulence has disappeared from the remarks of Albright and Rubin,
but not yet the rigidity of approach. The ambiguity of the White House is seemingly less,
but its stand is not yet as predictable as India would have liked it to be. The only
consistency in a forward-looking approach has been that of Talbott and Inderfurth.
Whether all this is part of a pre-agreed negotiating strategy at Washington or whether
this is the way Washington always works is not clear.
Whatever it may be, Indian diplomacy, while apparently showing tactical flexibility
on the CTBT issue, has remained firm on certain other issues, which are of greater
consequence for India’s future security and autonomy in decision-making on national
security matters. These issues relate to the threat perception which impelled India to go
nuclear and Indian requirements, conventional as well as nuclear, to enable an adequate
response to future threats.
Through its firm and dignified refusal to indicate to the US what, in Indian perception,
would constitute an adequate, minimum nuclear deterrence and to agree to any steps, such
as the freezing of fissile material production and a moratorium on missile tests and
development, which could amount to a freezing of India’s nuclear and delivery
capability at the May,1998, level, the present Government, instead of letting itself be
overawed by US badgering on such issues like its predecessor Governments had done, has
made it clear that Indian decisions on India’s future security would be based on
Indian perceptions and assessments, past experience in dealing with potential
adversaries and continuing concerns with regard to the future and not on US perceptions.
While India would listen to US views in the matter, the determining factor in
policy-making would be Indian perceptions and concerns. The importance of a flexibility in
determining the nature and extent of the minimum nuclear deterrence in order to
continuously adjust it to the evolving regional situation in future has been underlined in
no uncertain terms.
That is what the US itself does in national security policy-making as would be evident
from its recent decision to step up funding on theatre missile defence after reports of
the upgradation of North Korea’s missile capability. It is unreasonable on the part
of the US to try to refuse to India a flexibility in national security policy-making which
it allows to itself.
A close study of the eight rounds of Indo-US talks held so far
would indicate two important gains for Indian diplomacy – an acceptance by the US of
the inevitability and the irreversibility of India’s de facto status as a
nuclear power even though it is disinclined to accord to India the de jure status
and of the legitimacy of India’s concerns relating to China.
However, it needs to be noted that while there is now a greater recognition of the
legitimacy of India’s concerns vis-�-vis China, there is still a reluctance to
express this recognition in categorical terms in public, in deference to China’s
sensitivities. A similar deference to India’s sensitivities has been lacking in US
policies which is partly responsible for the relations between India and the US, the two
greatest democracies of the world, failing to blossom to their full potential despite the
best of intentions on both sides.
Another point which needs to be underlined in any analysis is that the US Administration,
while now accepting the legitimacy of India’s concerns regarding China, continues to
give the impression that in its belief these concerns, while legitimate, are still
overstated in order for India to justify having a nuclear and delivery capability much
larger than warranted by ground reality.
At the same time, there is still an attempt to keep the focus narrowly on Indo-Pakistan
relations while closing the eyes to the broader picture of China’s continuing
upgradation of its nuclear and missile capability, its close military relations with
Myanmar which legitimately add to India’s nervousness despite assurances from China
and Myanmar and China’s assertion by stealth of its territorial claims in the Spratly
group of Islands.
The experience of the Philippines proves, if further proof was needed, as to what could
happen to a country if it accepts Chinese professions of friendship and good intentions
and neglects its defence.
While there has been a lot of spotlight on the so-called benchmarks approved by the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council and the Group of 8 Countries and which the US
has been using as a yardstick for measuring the progress of the talks, little notice has
been taken in the American press and by US analysts of the two benchmarks which the
present Government in New Delhi has been using for measuring the seriousness of the US
desire for improving its relations with India and for according to India the importance
which it merits.
The first benchmark relates to India’s autonomy of
decision-making in national security matters and the second to the removal of the unfair
and discriminatory denial of advanced technology to India in various fields on the
baseless ground that such technology could enable India upgrade its nuclear and missile
capability.
The denial is unfair because there is no previous evidence of India misusing dual-purpose
technology for military purposes and discriminatory in relation to the USA’s
kid-glove approach to China.
On paper, similar technological disabilities have been imposed on China too since the
Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, but exemptions have been given to Beijing on a
case by case basis as in the case of nuclear power stations and China’s flouting of
these restrictions to acquire sensitive technologies with the connivance of US companies,
which has been well-documented by Congressional committees, has been overlooked in the
long-term interests of Sino-US relations.
India’s praiseworthy record of refraining from misuse of technologies acquired from
the US and of adhering to US restrictions however unfair they might be without trying to
clandestinely circumvent them as China has been repeatedly doing, has remained
unrecognised and unreflected in US policies.
The eight rounds of Jaswant Singh-Talbott talks have shown that given the required vision
and understanding, the two countries could be on the threshold of a new era of
bilateral relations devoid of the complexes and mindsets of the past, but to what extent
such relations would mature and flourish would depend, amongst other factors, on the
US giving up using two yardsticks in policy-making in nuclear matters—one for
India and the other for China— and on its showing the same deference to the
sensitivities of India as it does to those of China.
B.RAMAN
7-2-99
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India, and presently Director, Institute For Topical Studies,
Chennai.E-Mail Address:[email protected] )
