The recent events in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) have not been happening by
themselves. They have apparently been made to happen--- whether the first faltering steps
towards a dialogue and as yet elusive peace by peace-hungry Kashmiris and others in India
and abroad or the retaliatory escalation of terrorism by sections of the Pakistani
military leadership through their foreign mercenaries and other surrogates in the State in
order to abort India's search for a political solution, without the involvement of
Pakistan.
The search has received a set-back at the very start partly due
to unwise handling by New Delhi and partly due to circumstances beyond its control. The
unwise handling lay in the hype and high-profile manner in which the exercise was started
and in the embarrassment caused to violence-weary sections of the Hizbul-Mujahideen (HM)
by the ill-advised attempts of New Delhi to draw propaganda mileage out of the HM's
willingness for a cease-fire and dialogue by taking the initial steps in the full glare of
media publicity.
Such exercises have to be discreetly handled without hype or
publicity and the State has to control the urge to score propaganda points, as was done in
1975, when Laldenga, the leader of the Mizo National Front (MNF), who was irritated with
the Pakistani control over him, was quietly helped to escape out of Pakistan to Geneva and
start a dialogue with New Delhi, without any publicity.
The recent exercise in Kashmir, which is temporarily halted, but,
wisely, not yet given up, was not the result of any ill-considered initiative. It was a
carefully thought-out and well-analysed step based on the following ground realities:
* The violence-fatigue of the Kashmiris and the indigenous
militant groups and the steadily-spreading desire for peace in the local population.
* The growing resentment in the Valley over the hijacking of the
indigenous movement for self-determination by Pakistan-backedforeign mercenaries to
achieve their own agenda of Wahabisingthe Kashmiri Muslims and having the State
incorporated into a Wahabised and Talibanised Pakistan.
* The realisation by the people of J&K that by its
misadventure in Kargil last year and by its support of Wahabi terrorism, Pakistan has
forfeited what-ever support it might have enjoyed in the US and elsewhere on the Kashmir
issue.
In July, when the exercise came overground, there were
expectations, which seemed reasonable at that time, that Gen.Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's
Chief Executive, while making pro forma criticism of the HM's offer to New Delhi, would
not actively come in the way of this exercise in order to secure Western, particularly US,
support for the rescheduling of a sizeable portion of Pakistan's external debts, which are
due for repayment on December 31.
Without such rescheduling, Pakistan's economy, already in a
shambles, might collapse. Moreover, there were indications that Gen.Musharraf, cramped in
his style of functioning, by the pro-Islamist elements in the Army headed by Lt.Gen.
Mohammed Aziz, his Chief of the General Staff (CGS), was trying to free himself and his
Kashmir policy from the stranglehold of these elements in order to give himself greater
room for manoeuvrability.
These expectations were belied. Lt.Gen. Aziz, a Kashmiri (a
Soodan) from Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), resisted Gen.Musharraf's attempts to ease
him out of the GHQ by posting him as the Commanding Officer of the 5 Corps in Karachi in
place of Lt.Gen. Muzaffar Usmani, who was to be brought to the GHQ as the CGS.
Gen.Musharraf's calculation was that since Lt.Gen.Usmani was also
close to the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI), his replacing Lt.Gen.Aziz in the GHQ might not have
alarmed the Islamic parties. At the same time, since Lt.Gen.Usmani, like Gen.Musharraf
himself, is a Mohajir, he might have supported his Kashmir policy.
The Govt. of India's positive response to the HM's initial
cease-fire and dialogue offer, which did not include any condition for the involvement of
Pakistan in the dialogue, and the first, highly-publicised meeting in Srinagar between a
team of the HM and another of Govt.of India officials led by Shri Kamal Pandey, the Home
Secretary, caused alarm in Pakistan---not only amomgst the Islamic parties such as Qazi
Hussain Ahmed's JEI, Maulana Fazlur Rehman's Jamaat-e-Ulema (JEU), the Wahabi Markaz Dawa
Al Irshad, which controls the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Al Badr,
but also amongst those sections of the Army leadership led by Lt.Gen.Aziz, which have been
close to these Islamic extremist elements.
The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), headed by Lt.Gen.Mahmood
Ahmed, forced Syed Salahuddin, the POK-based leader of the HM, to demand the inclusion of
Pakistan in any dialogue and, when India did not accept this by the deadline of August
8,two previously identified ISI officers forcibly brought Syed Salahuddin to Islamabad and
made him issue his statement condemning India, withdrawing the cease-fire offer and
calling for the escalation of terrorism.
It is not yet clear whether Gen.Musharraf, under pressure from
the Islamic elements, had agreed to this action by the ISI or whether these sections of
the Army leadership took the action on their own and confronted him with a fait accompli,
thereby forcing him to approve their action ex-post facto.
Whatever be it, this was yet another instance of the continuous
retreat by him in the face of pressure from the Islamic extremist elements on various
issues such as emulating the Turkish model of a modern, secular Islam, the signing of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), modification of the blasphemy law to prevent
vexatious investigations and prosecutions, action to stop military training in the
madrasas, pressurising the Taliban to moderate its policies and expel Osama bin Laden,
restoration of the joint electorate system as recommended by the Election Commission,
documentation of the economy to reduce tax evasion and Islamisation of the economy.
On all these issues, he has succumbed to pressure from the
Islamic elements and abandoned the proposed actions. His inability or unwillingness to
confront the Islamic extremist elements--whether at senior levels of the Army leadership
or in the political arena-- has intensified the speculation as to whether he is leading
upfront or is being led against his will by a covert coalition of Islamic extremist groups
and officers sympathetic to them led by Lt.Gen.Aziz, constituting a junta within the
junta.
Mr.Abdul Malik Kasi, Minister for Religious Affairs, told the
"Washington Post" on June 22,2000:" The Government cannot afford to rub the
religious groups the wrong way. If we hit them with a stick, they will hit us with a
gun."
So long as this junta within the junta continues to exercise a
predominant influence over policy-making, we should be prepared for more acts of terrorism
in J&K by its surrogates, but this should not deter the Govt. of India from keeping
open its lines of communications with the HM and other indigenous militant groups and
discreetly helping them in their attempts to extricate themselves out of the stranglehold
of Pakistan
