South Asia Analysis Group  
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Paper no. 144

 

INDIA-RUSSIA STRATEGIC COOPERATION: Time to move away

by Dr. Subhash Kapila

 

Executive Summary

* During the Cold War years.  India while not a member of any bloc due to her non-aligned activism, enjoyed a proximate relationship with Russia.

* The proximate India-Russia relationship embraced intense political, economic and military cooperation. This strategic cooperation reached its peak in August 1971 with the signing of the "Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace , Friendship and Cooperation"  incorporting security clauses.

* The contextual imperatives that  forged the India-Russia strategic cooperation were from the Indian side : US-Pakistan military alliance and aid,  Indo-US estrangement,  the Sino-Pak strategic relationship and the Sino-Pak-US stategic convergence.  On the Russian side the imperatives were : Sino Russian military confrontation, theSino-US quasi - strategic relationship of the 1975 s -1980s and the Russian need to reach out to Third World countries through India.

* The basic and common  denominator on both sides was the containment of China and Pakistan .

* These contextual imperatives underwent a sea-change with President Gorbachev coming into power.  He initiated what can be described as Russia's 'China First ' priority.  Russia's strategic shift in its foreign policy formulations removed the planks on which rested the India-Russia strategic cooperation.

* Russia "China First" policy was vigorously pursued by President Yeltsin, and received active pursuance by President Putin.

* Russia latest foreign policy document (Foreign Policy of the  Russian Federation July 20,2000) is reflective of Russia's 'China First' Policy.

* At the turn of the millienium, India which so heavily rested  for its national security interests on strategic cooperation with Russia is faced with the crucial question: 'Is it time to move away'. 

* The question gets further reinforced when it is seen that Russia's switch to China has incorporated a Russia-China strategic coalition and build-up of China's military power and force projection capabilities by advanced Russian weapon systems.  The same has security implication for India.

Following conclusions can be made:

*  India should move away from this strategic relationship, while continuing its traditional friendship with Russia.

*  India should explore and excercise alternative strategic options which furthers her national interests.

* India should decrease her military dependence on Russia.

*  India should not enter into creation of any multipolar initation of the kind of Russia-China India Triangle.  These are strategically inadvisable.

Background

India and Russia enjoyed a close strategic relationship for the major portion of the Cold War. The peak point of this relationship was the conclusion of the Indo- Soviet ‘Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation’ signed in 1971. With the emergence of two independent states of India and Pakistan on the Indian sub-continent in August 1947, the United States made the first bid to co.opt India as a regional partner, but without success. Nehru’s socialistic inclinations and his Anglicized distaste for Americans drew him closer then to USSR and China, Nehru’s self-righteousness in foreign affairs was equally matched by US secretary of State, Dulles who as early as 1947 remarked that "Soviet Communism exercises a strong influence through the interim Hindu Government." ¹

The India – Russia strategic relation was a comprehensive one embracing political, military, cultural and economic cooperation and exchanges. The proximity between the two countries led at times to India being labelled as a Soviet satellite. Some basic points in the relationship are

* India-Russia strategic cooperation has been good as long as Russia gave primacy to its Indian relationship.

* India-Russia strategic relationship was good as long as China stood excluded from Russian foreign policy priorities.

* India-Russia strategic relationship was good as long as China figured in Russian threat perceptions. This was when China was engaged in a quasi-strategic alliance with USA.

In international relations, there are contextual imperatives that prompt forging of strategic relationships or undoing them. This applies to the India-Russia strategic relationship also.

India-Russia Strategic Cooperation in the Past: The Contextual Imperatives

The historical background of events that led to the emergence of the India-Russia strategic cooperation are well known. An analytical review of the historical background would indicate that in the main, the following contextual imperatives helped or spurred the forging of the India-Russia strategic relationship:

* United States military aid to Pakistan

* Sino-Russian confrontation

* Indo-US estrangement

* Sino-US quasi-strategic Alliance

* Sino-Pak strategic Nexus

* US – Pak military alliances

* Russia’s need to reach out to the Third World through India, as a leading nation.

In terms of detailed examination of Soviet foreign relations, their policies and processes in relation to South Asia, the following observations stand made by an American Professor are relevant .²

* "The Soviet-Indian relationship rests on two pillars of mutual interest: the containment of China and the reduction of Western influence in the region."

* "Additionally, the USSR "uses" India’s status as a leader of the non-aligned movement to bolster Soviet policy in the Third World".

* "India uses Soviet economic and military aid to pursue its own regional goals, the most important of which are containment of Pakistan and Bangladesh."

* "In other words, the Soviet Union and India have the basis for an ideal relationship: India’s needs are a match for Soviet capabilities, and Soviet needs are a match for India’s strengths."

* "The Soviet-Indian relationship works best when both perceive a link between China and Pakistan."

A little realised facet which also facilitated a proximate India-Soviet relationship was that: "Over the years the monolithic structure of the defunct Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) established harmonious relationships with an equally monolithic Congress Party in India." ³

India-Russia Strategic Relationship : Time to Move Away?

In relation to the contextual imperatives that forged the India-Russia strategic relationship, a contemporaneous review of the regional and international scene reveals the following changes that have taken place:

* The Cold War ended a decade back, resulting in the emergence of the United States as a unipolar power.

* The disintegration of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the economy and the economic upheaval have diluted Russia’s countervailing power both regionally and globally.

* Sino-Russian confrontation stands replaced by a growing strategic nexus between Russia and China. Their strategic aim is to dilute America’s unipolar status.

* Post-Afghanisation withdrawal, Russia has embarked on repairing relations with Pakistan.

* The Sino-Pak strategic nexus in South Asia has gone to alarming lengths where China has not only provided nuclear weapons blueprints but also provided ballistic missiles and missile production plants to Pakistan.

* In March 2000, the United States drew the curtains on its special relationship with Pakistan. Concurrently it has embarked on building and repairing its relations with India.

* Islamic fundamentalism and Islami Jehad have raised their ugly heads in India, Central Asian Republics, China, Russia and targetted USA too.

* China has embarked on building its military power and force projection capabilities as pre-requisites for its aspirations for super-power status.

That the contextual imperatives which shaped the India-Russia strategic partnership have either been swept away or stand significantly diluted. Further "In the Cold War years, superpower rivalry tended to aggravate or even perpetuate conflict in South Asia in the form of contending alliances. The end of the Cold War and break-up of the Soviet Union, have however transformed that rivalry into Washington/ Moscow policy coordination and have in its wake brought about a grand shift from alliance to realignment in South Asia." ⁴

More significantly, in relation to what was the cornerstone of the India-Russia strategic relationship, the 1971 Peace and Friendship Treaty, itself was questioned by the Russians themselves as early as 1992. It has been observed that: "The breakup of the Soviet union has put an end to the Indo-Soviet special relationship. Both the Russian Federation and India have decided to sign a new political treaty to replace the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which was extended for another twenty years in 1991. But according to Indian press reports, the Russian side has asked for deletion of security related articles from the original treaty." ⁵

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, successive Russian Foreign Ministry spokesmen have consistently stressed that Russia will honour all past agreements and treaties, "But this rhetoric could not hide the fact that the Indo-Soviet treaty was no longer relevant to a situation in which India would be in a confrontation with both China and Pakistan, which conceivably was India’s chief rationale in the first place ……" ⁶ and further that "Article 9 of the Indo-Soviet Treaty, which provided for military cooperation in the event of a military threat to either party had, therefore, now become a benefit of dubious value for India." ⁷

Circumstantially, therefore, it is time that India moves away from the strategic relationship of a proximate nature that it enjoyed with Russia until Gorbachev came into power and disintegration of USSR took place. Gorbachev had given notice of change of priorities in Russia’s foreign policies in favour of China at his famous Vladivostok speech – the border settlement, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. Somehow India missed noticing Russia’s switch in priorities i.e. a China predominant policy as early as 1986.

Russia’s Strategic Switch: China Favoured Over India

The mainstay of India-Russia strategic partnership and the Indo-Soviet Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1971 was to make India secure against threats from China and Pakistan.  Russia in acceding to the 1971 Treaty had made a conscious strategic choice between India and China. Gorbachev set in motion the paradigm switch towards China. It is unclear whether the Indian authorities sensed it.   His successor Yeltsin followed this switch more vigorously. Following Yeltsin, President Putin seems to be continuing the policies set by his two predecessors in giving China overriding priority in Russia’s foreign policy relationship.

"By the middle of 1989, Indo-Soviet relations drifted into a situation, presaging the need for their complete re-casting which had to come about with Gorbachev’s removal ….." ⁸ so writes an eminent Indian Foreign Secretary. In fact it can be maintained that India’s Russia policy needed rehashing soon after Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech in 1986 when he initiated the Russian switch towards China. It was Gorbachev who "called for a new China Policy" and it was he "who called for an end to a China encirclement policy" and it was Gorbachev who conceded China’s "basic demands for normalisation of relations: Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Soviet pressure to get Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and the reduction of Soviet military presence along its borders with China." ¹⁰

The decade of the 1990s witnessed a rapidly galloping Russia-China relationship especially in  strategic spheres. Concurrent with this was the growing cold-shouldering of India especially between 1989 and 1996 when some corrections were applied, Primakov became the Prime Minister.

Yeltsin while adopting a policy of building up a strategic relationship of coalition with China, "emphasised a need for de-ideologisation of its (Russia’s) foreign policy" which "resulted in Russia adopting a ‘wait and see’ policy towards India " led to" in the new Russia placing the Indo-Russia relations in a precarious position." ¹¹

President Putin’s Government documents ‘Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation ¹² issued on July 10, 2000 continues to reflect the Russian switch to China. This document states the following objectives on China and India:

China

"The concurrence of the fundamental approaches of Russia and People’s Republic of China to the key issues of world problems is one of the mainstays of regional and global stability. Russia seeks to develop mutually advantageous cooperation with China in all areas." ¹³

India

"Russia intends to strengthen its traditional friendship with India, including in the international affairs and to aid overcome problems persisting in South Asia and strengthen stability in the region." ¹⁴

An analytical observer would be able to grasp the subtle Russian nuances in terms of Russian priorities vis-�-vis China and India. This would indicate that what remains of the Russia-India strategic cooperation now is only ‘traditional friendship’. Russia’s switch towards China, and which is likely to grow further into an intensified ‘strategic coalition’ (they may both shy away from terming it a ‘strategic alliance’) necessitates examination of two other topics, namely:

-  India’s military dependence on Russia

-  Russia’s advocacy of establishment of a Russia-China-India triangle (Political and Security overtones).

India’s Military Dependence on Russia: The Need for Diversification

India’s military dependence on Russia can be said to be virtually total since 1965 in terms of military hardware for all three arms of its armed forces. The inventories existing of Russian equipment and the large scale orders currently contracted or under discussion, stand well documented in a number of publications. ¹⁵

Some major facts that need to be highlighted are:

* "After 30 years of reliance on Soviet produced hardware, India finds itself in a position where its armed forces are critically dependent on Russian equipment and spares to the tune of: ¹⁶

Army - 75%

Air Force - 80%

Navy - 85%

* The 10 year Indo-Russian Agreement upto 2010 on military – technological cooperation which includes advanced weapon systems is worth $ 15 billion. ¹⁷

* Estimate show that over 800 Russian defence production facilities are kept in operation by Indian Defence Contracts. ¹⁸

* Russia’s military industrial complex will be hard pressed to survive without India as a reliable client. ¹⁹

* Russia’s weapon sales provide the badly needed hard currency the nation requires. ²⁰

It also needs to be pointed out that:

* India’s defence purchases from Russia are no longer on rupee payments. Hard currency payments are made.

* Russian spare parts are now sold at rates of over 300 – 500% as compared to earlier years.

* In the early 1990’s when Indo-Russian relations were on hold, spare-parts for India’s weapon systems were virtually stopped affecting India’s military readiness.

The implications of this overwhelming Indian military dependence on Russia meant:

* India’s over-reliance on Russian weapon systems and their easy availability has directly contributed to slow progress in India’s indigenous self-reliance and progress of DRDO capabilities and achievements.

* India’s pre-dominant reliance on Russian weapon systems and military equipment is a serious strategic drawback, especially in the changed nature of inter-se relationship between the two countries.

* India’s predominant reliance on Russian military equipment opens India to Russia’s coercive pressures during critical situations.

* With Russian defence production in disarray, production times for contracted equipment is slow, thereby affecting India’s military readiness.

* Quality of Russian weapon systems in recent past has been poor and defective. This has created disquiet in India’s military circles. Some reports indicate that as high as 80% of Russian systems are found defective in performance. Reports indicate that Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes had to raise this point officially during his recent visit to Moscow.²¹

Additionally, a sinister implication that has arisen in this field is the rapidly growing supply of Russian military systems to China during the last five years. The implications for India’s security are enormous, and it is surprising that the Indian media should be found wanting in highlighting this threat, especially those who have strategic analysts on their rolls. Only one analysis seems to have come into print  by Jyotsna Bakshi, a Research Fellow at IDSA ²². Some pertinent observations from her article appropriate for our analysis, are noted below:

* China has received $ 7 billion worth of advanced weapon systems from Russia during the period 1996-1997.

* China will be buying $ 20 billion worth of Russian hi-tech air force and naval systems between 2000 – 2004.

* Russia’s supplies of military hardware in sizeable quantities include:

- SU 27 fighter aircraft – 26.

- IL 76 strategic airlift transport aircraft

- TU-22 Backfire bombers

- SU-27 SK fighter aircraft - 300

- MI-17 helicopters - 30

- SU-30 MI multi purpose combat aircraft 200

- Ka-31 helicopters

- Nuclear powered submarines Typhoon Class

- Submarines, KILO Class - 8

- Destroyers - 5

- Soveremmeny Class Destroyers - 4

- S-300 Anti missile systems

- SA-10 SAM systems - 14

- T-72 Tank 50

- T-80 Tanks 200

* The above is only a partial list. The actual orders are reported to be much more.

* Russia supplied technology for DF 31/41 ICBMs to China enhancing her ICBM capabilties.

* Russia has proposed that China become a partner in the GLONASS navigational satellite system which would enable nuclear weapons and missile targeting, and control of nuclear submarines.

* More than 4000 Russian scientists and technicians are working in Chinese defence production facilities.

* Transfer of Russian military technology for all advanced weapons systems sold to China.

Russia’s supply of advanced military weapon systems and equipment to China has led to the following:

* China’s war machine which was primitive until Russian arms supplies commenced in 1992 stands substantially upgraded.

* Russia’s military contributions to China in the last five years has enabled China to develop significant offensive capabilities in terms of its airforce and navy

* Russian technical assistance has added to significant expansion of Chinese ICBM capabilities.

* Russia has enabled China to develop blue-water naval capabilities.

* Russian technology transferred under licence to China is being passed on to Pakistan (RD-33 engines for FS1 fighter).

* India financed Russian R & D for SU-30 MK multi role combat aircraft as per Indian specifications. Russia has agreed to sell this version to China also despite agreement with India, that it will not be sold to China.

The Security implications for India of Russia’s military supplies to China are stupendous namely:

* Russia has enabled China to overcome and surpass the qualitative edge that India enjoyed in the conventional weapons field. ²³

* Russian supplies of advanced weapons to China have led to significant accretion of Chinese offensive capabilities. Indian security, therefore comes under strain as India’s contingency planning would now have to create assets to meet enhanced Chinese threats.

* The above also enables China build-up of blue water naval capability. This would result in China’s intrusive naval presence in South Asian waters. A naval dimension now gets added to the existing Chinese land threat to India.

Russia’s military build-up of China cannot   be defined as contributing to its traditional friendship with India. One does not build up adversaries against one’s friends. All these developments suggest that:

* India needs to diversify immediately its military dependence on Russia.

* India must on a crash basis go in for indigenous production of spare parts for Russian military hardware on Indian inventories.

* India must buy Russian origin equipment from East European & Central Asian countries for cannibalization to create spares reserves.

It is ironic that while Russia had decisively moved away strategically and politically from India by 1990. India took no steps until 1998 to move away from its Russian military dependence and diversify to other sources.

Russia – China – India Triangle : Strategically Inadvisable for India

The formation of a Russia-China-India triangular relationship or axis has been advocated by both President Yeltsin (1993) and Prime Minister Primakov in 1996. Many Russian and Indian academics followed suit in advocating it. A realistic appraisal of the following factors would indicate that it is politically and more so strategically inadvisable for India to join such a triangle / axis:

* Russia and China perceive USA as a threat and hence this advocacy. India does not perceive USA as a threat.

* USA does not pose any threat to India. On the contrary USA has this year pulled the curtain off its special relationship with Pakistan.

* Any power bloc composed of Russia and China would be perceived by Asia – Pacific countries as a potential threat. India cannot therefore, be part of an axis that generates fears in countries which have always been friendly with India.

* China is part of the strategic nexus with Pakistan aimed at India. How can India be a part of a condition in which two of its potential threats are inter-twined?

* China does not treat India as an equal. How can India be therefore be a partner of such a bloc.

* For a Russia-China-India triangle to emerge, China would have to concede India’s pre-eminent status in South Asia. This would also mean giving up China’s strategic nexus with Pakistan. China will not do so.

Hence a Russia-China-India triangle is an unworkable proposition, besides being strategically inadvisable for India.

Russia’s Current Perceptions of its Relationship with India

This analysis would be incomplete if current Russian perceptions of its relationship with India are not taken into account before reaching conclusions. Leaving aside political statements of Russian leaders, a sampling of views by Russian political analysts are quoted below to highlight the emerging trends:

Vladimir Baranovosky ²⁴

* "In an era of massive realignment, Russia appreciates India’s continuing insistence with non-aligned status and its caution and restraint in development of ties with the United States of America, especially in the area of arms transfers."

* "India’s ascendance to the status of a declared nuclear weapon power has produced mixed feelings in Russia… However, the very fact of India going ‘nuclear may be seen by Russia as devaluing its own nuclear arsenal which is almost the sole remaining symbol of its great power status and an important bargaining chip in the international arena."

* "It seems clear, however, that both powers assign each other considerable roles in their respective foreign policy calculations. In particular, the rapprochement is generated by India’s search for higher international status and Russia’s desire to prevent further erosion of its global role."

Vladimir Moskalenko & Tatiana Shaunna ²⁵

* "The appearance of two new possessors of nuclear arms in South Asia is a serious challenge to Russia’s National Security."

* At the same time an improvement of Russia’s relations with Pakistan as the second party in the South Asia confrontation seems possible and must run in parallel to further expansion and strengthening of relations with India."

Felix N Yurolov ²⁶

* "With the emergence of a new President of the Russian Federation, it has to strengthen its eastern policy by making it more concrete, more substantial, and more dynamic. Russian-Indian bi-lateral relations and international cooperation between the two countries must be a very important part of this policy."

* The signing of the ‘Declaration of Strategic Partnership’ between Russia and India should not be further delayed."

* "It is also in Russia’s interests to call for support of India’s entry to UN Security Council as a permanent member.

* "In any case we have to admit that the fundamental changes in the world balance of forces have had a direct bearing on Russia-India relations. While formulating their strategy of national interests and security, Russia and India should fully take into account the radical changes that have taken place in the international system. They cannot ignore the new realities."

These are very interesting Russian thoughts, but somehow they seem to compartmentalise Russia. India focus to South Asia only. The Russian analysts are also silent on the strategic coalition that has emerged between Russia and China and how it impacts on the India-Russia relations. Felix Yurolov (the last named Russian analyst) seems to be conceding that by implied analysis, namely, each country to take into account its own national interests and security.

Concluding Analysis

In state craft and foreign policy formulations, as Lord Salisbury once stated that there are no permanent friends or foes, only permanent interests. The same dictum applies to India-Russia relations also. The changed parameters of Russia’s foreign policy according an overriding priority to its China relationship and building up a Russia-China coalition aimed at the United States unipolarity, imperatively demands that India too carries out a re-appraisal of what was once a strategic relationship between India and Russia.

When Russia made a conscious decision to enter into a strategic coalition with China, it could surely not have been oblivious to India’s threat perceptions about China. It could have been foreseen that Gorbachev’s concessions to China would release her from her Pacific preoccupations and permit additional Chinese military formations for deployment on its Southern Peripheries complicating India’s security problems²⁷. Russian upgradation of Chinese offensive capabilities cannot be exclusively confined for use against USA; they could be used elsewhere. However, Russia in its defence could argue, that these determinations were made in Russia’s national interests. Similar India prerogatives need to be conceded by Russia, without rancour.

While Russia in pursuance of its national interests and security has cast its lot with China, India’s national interests and security needs demand that:

* India moves away from its erstwhile strategic relationship with Russia and exercise alternative options.

* India drastically reduces its military dependency on Russian weapon systems and spares. Immediate diversification is the answer.

* India unambiguously declares that it is not interested in creation of any multi-polar structures and especially not the kind being advocated of a Russia-China-India triangle. There are many other ‘poles’ which will emerge in the natural evolution of the global structure.

* Many years ago, USA gave an assurance that American arms given to Pakistan in aid will not be used against India. Pakistan did use the same. There is no guarantee that Russian arms given to China will not be used against India in any future India- China conflict. India must take into account enhanced Chinese offensive capabilities arising from Russian arms supplies.

India and Russia can surely continue to have good friendly relations based on their proximity of the past. India and Russia can surely look for convergence of interests in the international field. However, seeking convergence with Russia cannot be at the expense of India’s quest for newer strategic cooperative link with countries like USA, France, Israel, Vietnam, Japan and South Africa. More realistically, and in tune with the emerging international system, it is Russia which would need to be more accommodative in seeking strategic convergence with India. India needs to be aware of the many alternative strategic options open to her, other than Russia, which the emerging international security environment provides her.  India should be ready and have the will to play the ‘India card’.

7.9.2000

NOTES:

1.  William J Barnds, ‘India Pakistan and the Great Powers’. New York, Praegar Publishers, 1972. P121
2.  Peter Zwick, ‘Soviet Foreign Relations: Process and Policy’. New Jersey, Prentice – Hall, 1990. PP 316 – 318.
3.  PL Dash, ‘Soviet Disintegration and Challengers in Indo-CIS Relations’ in Stephen P Cohen, Ed ‘South Asia After the Cold War: International Perspectives: ACDIS Papers. 1992 P5.
4.  Lin Maohui ‘From conflict to conciliation and cooperation’ in Stephen P Cohen, Ed, ACDIS Papers 1992 quoted above P 45.
5.  Ibid P 46
6.  Shelton U. Kodikara, ‘South Asian Security Dilemmas in the Post-Cold War World’ in Stephen P Cohen, Ed, ACDIS Papers 1992 quoted above. P 149.
7.  Ibid, P 150.
8.  J. N. Dixit, ‘Across Borders: Fifty Years of India’s Foreign Policy’, New Delhi, Picus Books, 1998 P 180.
9.  John R Faust & Judith F Kornberg, ‘China in World Politics, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers 1995 P 109.
10.  Ibid: PP 4 – 5.
11.  Jerome M Conley, ‘India-Russia Military and Nuclear Cooperation: Implications for US Security.’ US Air Force, National Strategic Institute Studies Paper, February 2000.
12.  ‘Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation’, Special Issue dated July 20, 2000 issued by the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow.
13.  Ibid P 18.
14.  Ibid P 19.
15.  For detailed inventories ‘Military Balance 2000’ may be seen. Annual details of arms transfers can be scrutinised in the SIPRI Annual Year Book. For details of recent contracts and other aspects of Russian arms sales and defence production see ‘DEFENSE NEWS, July 17, 2000.
16.  Jerome M Conley, Feb 2000 See reference at Note 11.
17.  Ibid.
18.  Ibid.
19.  Richard F Grimmet, Senior Defense Analyst, US congressional Research Service Washington quoted in ‘India Abroad’, September 1, 2000. P 8.
20.  Ibid.
21.  Ibid.
22. Jyotsna Bakshi, ‘Russia-China Military – Technical Cooperation : Implications for India’, Strategic Analysis, Monthly Journal of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, July 2000 Vol XXIV No.4 PP 633 – 667.
23.  Ibid. P 661.
24.  Vladimir Baranovsky, ‘Challenges and Opportunities for National and International Security in Gennady Chufrin, Ed, ‘Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda’, SIPRI, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999 PP 25 – 26.
25.  Vladimir Moskalenko and Tatiana Shaunna, ‘Russia’s Security and the Geopolitical Situation in South Asia in Gennady Chufrin, Ed (1999) above P 240.
26.  Felix N Yuralov ‘Russia : Problems of Security in Post Cold War World’ in ‘World Affairs’ (New Delhi) Volume 4\, No. 2, April – June 2000 PP 51-55.
27.  Brigadier Subhash Kapila, ‘The China Threat is Real’, Journal of the United Services Institutions of India (New Delhi) Vol XXVIII, No. 533, July – September 1998.