US, INDIA & TERRORISM
by B.Raman
(To be read in continuation of the paper of May
2,2001, titled "USA,Pakistan & Terrorism" (www.saag.org/papers3/paper236.html
)
Action by the US against state-sponsors of international
terrorism is governed by Section 2656 (f) of Title 22, relating to Foreign
Relations and Intercourse, of the US Code enacted by the Congress on
December 22,1987, Section 6 (j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979
and Section 2405 (j) of the Appendix to Title 50, relating to War and
National Defence, of the US Code.
Section 2405(j) and the 1979 Act require the Secretary
of State to make a determination in respect of a country "which has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism". Any
country, which becomes the subject of such determination, is categorised
as a state-sponsor of international terrorism.
Section 2656(f) defines "international
terrorism" as "terrorism involving citizens or territory of more
than one country". States, which support domestic terrorist
groups whose activities are confined to the territory of one country and
directed against its nationals only, would not attract the provisions of
US laws unless their acts of terrorism are directed against foreign
nationals, particularly US nationals or interests, in its territory.
This Section also indicates the data to be collected by
the Secretary of State on the basis of which the determination of a
state-sponsor of international terrorism is
made. These include:
* Its stand and voting record during discussions in
international fora on terrorism.
* Its co-operation with the US in counter-terrorism, its
response to terrorism affecting US citizens and/or interests and its
action on extradition requests from the US. (Italics author's)
* Support extended by it to international terrorist
groups, in the form of funds, training, weapons or shelter.
By an amendment of 1996, the Congress requires the State
Department to report on the extent to which other countries co-operate
with the US in apprehending, convicting and punishing terrorists
responsible for attacking US citizens or interests. The amendment also
requires that this report describe the extent to which foreign governments
are co-operating or have co-operated during the previous five years, in
preventing future acts of terrorism.
Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as
amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
requires/empowers the Secretary of State to review every year the
activities of non-American terrorist organisations and to designate as
Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTO) those against which action under US
laws is required to prevent them from posing a threat to US
nationals/interests. The designations carry the following legal
consequences:
* It is unlawful to provide funds or other material
support to a designated FTO.
* FTO can be denied visas or excluded from the United
States.
* US financial institutions must block funds of
designated FTOs and their agents and must report the blockage to the US
Department of the Treasury.
The purpose of these legislative measures is to protect
US nationals/interests and not foreign nationals/interests from acts of
international terrorist groups. The laws of 1979 and 1987 are
directed against States which sponsor the activities of international
terrorist organisations endangering American lives/interests and the law
of 1996 is directed against international terrorist organisations which
endanger American lives/ interests.
The Secretary of State submits to Congress two reports
every year--one in April titled "Patterns of Global Terrorism"
during the previous year, which is prepared essentially from the point of
view of examining whether any change in the existing list of
State-sponsors of international terrorism is required and the other in
October under the 1996 law to recommend any changes in the list of FTOs.
The list so amended in October is appended to the
Patterns of Global Terrorism report submitted to the Congress the
following April. In addition, a list of terrorist organisations,
which were active the previous year, but against which there was not
sufficient evidence to warrant their being designated as FTOs is also
appended.
Pakistan is already suffering from a series of sanctions
imposed by the US against it on the nuclear proliferation issue under the
Pressler Amendment invoked against it in 1990 and under the Glenn
Amendment invoked in 1998. Those sanctions only affect bilateral
economic and military assistance, US support for assistance to Pakistan by
multilateral institutions and transfer of sensitive technology, but they
do not affect normal business relations with Pakistan, there being no
restrictions on the flow of direct and portfolio investment to Pakistan by
US businessmen and on the flights of the Pakistan International Airlines (PIA)
to the US. The only business-related restriction presently in force
against Pakistan is the ban on the grant of the political risk insurance
cover by US-Government owned institutions to US businessmen investing in
Pakistan.
If Pakistan is declared a State-sponsor of international
terrorism, the wider, business-related sanctions could also apply thereby
putting greater pressure on the Pakistan regime. Other countries
designated by the US in the past as State-sponsors of international
terrorism have managed to survive despite the comprehensive US sanctions,
but their economies suffered badly in the process, setting back their
developmental aspirations. India's hope is that fears of similar
consequences to its economy might ultimately induce Pakistan to halt or at
least moderate its support to terrorism directed against India.
It was in 1991 that the Government of India decided to
share with the US Govt. on a regular basis all information relating to
Pakistani-sponsorship of terrorism directed against India and to request
the US Administration to declare Pakistan too as a State-sponsor of
international terrorism. Important landmarks since then are as
follows:
* 1992: Till 1991, the US Govt. was treating only
the Sikh terrorist organisations of the Punjab as terrorist
organisations, but was disinclined to consider the Kashmiri
organisations as terrorist organisations. However, after an attack
on a group of Israeli tourists in Srinagar by some Kashmiri terrorist
elements, the US Govt. came under pressure from Jewish lobbies to treat
the Kashmiri organisations also as indulging in terrorism. The
Patterns of Global Terrorism report, for the first time, took note of
India's allegations of Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism without
comment.
* 1993: The Clinton Administration placed
Pakistan in a so-called watch list of suspected state-sponsors of
international terrorism because of unhappiness over the non-cooperation
of Lt.Gen.Javed Nasir, the then Director-General of the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), and his officers in the implementation of a Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) project to buy back the unused Stinger
missiles from the Afghan Mujahideen. Pakistan was removed from the
list in July after Mr.Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister, removed
from the ISI Lt.Gen.Nasir and the other officers named by the US.
* 1995: The USA started monitoring closely the
activities of the Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA) after it targeted some US
citizens in Srinagar and New Delhi. It kidnapped under the name Al
Faran five Western tourists, including two Americans, of whom one
escaped and the remaining are believed to have been killed.
* 1997: The US designated the HUA as an FTO
under the 1996 law after evidence surfaced that the HUA was also
responsible for the assassination of some US nationals in Karachi.
This designation had no effect on the activities of the HUA since it had
no presence in the US. Since then, the Pakistan Government has
resisted repeated pressure from Washington to act against the HUA, which
changed its name to the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM). The HUM became
a member of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front For Jehad
Against the US and Israel in February 1998 and signed the Front's fatwa
calling for attacks on US and Israeli nationals/interests. Despite
this, no action was taken by Islamabad against it.
* 1998: The State Department started publishing
two lists as Annexures to the annual Patterns of Global Terrorism
report--the first list containing the names of organisations declared as
FTOs under the 1996 law and the second of organisations active the
previous year, but against whom there was not enough evidence to warrant
such a declaration. The HUM and the Al Qaeda of bin Laden figured
in the first list and the Sikh terrorist organisations and the Al Ummah
of Tamil Nadu in the second. The Govt. of India had never
complained to Washington about the Al Ummah, but the State Department
included its name on its own since it was suspected in a crude explosion
at a traffic junction near the US Consulate at Chennai.
* 1999: The US removed the Al Ummah from the
second list and retained the names of the Sikh terrorist organisations,
but did not include any of the Kashmiri or Pakistani terrorist
organisations . For the first time, the US started describing attacks by
Kashmiri organisations on civilians too as acts of terrorism and gave
details of its demarche with Pakistan regarding the Taliban. But,
there was no reference to any demarche on Pakistan's sponsorship of
terrorism against India.
* 2000: The US report referred to the evidence
against Pakistan in much greater detail than in the past--in the chapter
on South Asia as well as in that on State-sponsored terrorism--
particularly on Pakistan's support to the Taliban. There is
greater focus on Pakistan's nexus with the Taliban than on its nexus
with terrorist groups operating against India. The Sikh terrorist
organisations have been removed from the second list and, in their
place, the names of the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) and the Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LET) included. The HUM continues to figure in the first list and
its links with bin Laden have been brought on record for the first
time. While the HUM and the JEM have been treated as largely
Kashmiri organisations, the LET has been deemed to be a largely foreign
(Pakistani) terrorist organisation with international networking.
Despite strong evidence against the LET, as documented
in the report itself, the US, while making its annual review in
October,2000, did not designate the LET as an FTO. While legal
difficulties were cited for this, the real reason seems to be that the LET
has so far refrained from targeting US nationals/interests.
Similarly, the US has refrained from declaring Pakistan
a state-sponsor of international terrorism despite the following strong
evidence as documented in the report itself:
* Pakistan's failure to act on the USA's demarche
regarding the Taliban, despite its promise of compliance with the UN
sanctions.
* Its failure to act against the HUM, despite its
established links with bin Laden.
Explaining their reluctance to declare Pakistan a
State-sponsor of international terrorism, officials of the present as well
as the previous Administration have cited Pakistan's co-operation with the
US in the arrest, deportation and prosecution of terrorists involved in
acts of terrorism against the US and found in Pakistani territory.
A careful reading of the report on Patterns of Global
Terrorism during 2000 would show that the focus has been largely on
Pakistan's nexus with the Taliban, which endangers American lives/
interests and only to a very much smaller extent on its nexus with
terrorism directed against Indian nationals/interests.
It is no wonder that the Musharraf regime is calculating
that if it continued to co-operate with the US or make a pretense of
co-operating in respect of terrorists, based in Pakistan and endangering
American lives/ interests, the US would continue to refrain from taking
any action against it because of its sponsorship of terrorism against
India and of its inaction against the Taliban. It remains to be seen
how far its calculation proves to be correct.
The ambivalence marking the report is strikingly brought
out by the following fact. The USA's concerns regarding threats to
American nationals/ interests from terrorist groups operating in South
Asia are mainly focussed on the Taliban and the various terrorist groups
assisted by it. Despite this, the Taliban does not figure either in
the list of State-sponsors of international terrorism or even in the list
of FTOs under the 1996 law.
There could be understandable reasons for the US
inability to declare the Taliban a State-sponsor since the US does not
recognise the legality of the Taliban Govt. However, it is difficult to
understand its reluctance to declare the Taliban at least as a terrorist
organisation.
Even though India has not so far succeeded in persuading
the US Administration to declare Pakistan a State-sponsor, a careful
analysis of the progress of India's efforts since 1991 would show that the
opinion and sympathies of law and policy-makers in the US on
counter-terrorism has been steadily, but slowly moving in a direction
favourable to India and detrimental to Pakistan. India should not,
therefore, relent in its efforts.
India has now a network of co-operation with a number of
countries, including the USA, all of which are concerned over the threats
posed by Jehadists of Pakistani and Afghan origin. Counter-terrorism has
an operational as well as a diplomatic aspect. While the operational
aspect deals with the terrorists and their State-sponsors on the ground,
the diplomatic aspect deals with international networking to help the
security forces in their ground operations.
In the past, in the US, this diplomatic aspect of
counter-terrorism was dealt with by the different territorial desks
without a single nodal point dealing with the problem on a global
scale. It was to remove this deficiency that the set-up of the
Special Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism in the State Department was
created. This is a good model which could be considered for
emulation by India.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For
Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: [email protected]
)
