NMD-TMD: RIGHT QUESTION, WRONG ANSWER
by B.Raman
Executive Assessment
Not only to the rest of the world, but even to many in
the US, the over-enthusiasm of the US Administration for the National
Missile Defence (NMD) and the Theater Missile Defence (TMD) project is a
mystery. What is it due to?
The political debt owed by the Conservative Congressmen
and by the present Bush administration to the military-industrial complex,
which was a major contributor to their election funds? This suspicion is
strengthened by the fact that whereas the NMD/TMD project as contemplated
by the Clinton Administration would have pumped into the
military-industrial complex orders worth US $ 30 to 60 billion, the
project as modified by the present Bush Administration would reportedly
bring the complex orders worth US $ 200 billion in the next 10 years.
Threats to the security of the USA, its allies and its
troops abroad, particularly in Asia, from the Weapon of Mass Destruction
(WMD) and missile capabilities of the so-called rogue States (North Korea,
Iran, and Iraq) and non- State actors such as the Pakistan and
Afghanistan-based Islamic terrorist groups? Likely threats from the rogue
States (not including Pakistan) are cited by the Bush Administration as
the main motivating factor for its decision, but this reason is not taken
seriously by the rest of the world. Even the Israeli intelligence
does not believe that Libya and Iraq have or are likely to have in the
near or distant future a WMD and long-range missile capability.
North Korea has a long-range missile capability and Iran may have one in
the near future, but would they be so foolish as to use it against the US
or Israel and invite massive retaliation? Not many think so.
Even Israel, which closely monitors WMD and missile
developments in its neighbourhood, does not believe that an expensive and
questionably effective missile defence is the answer to such
threats. In its view, the only effective answer is to destroy their
capability on the ground even before they could complete it as it did to
Iraq's Osirak reactor instead of waiting till they acquire the capability
and countering it through a missile defence.
Israel is more worried over the possibility of the
Islamic terrorist groups in Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics
(CARs) coming to power one day and having their finger on the
nuclear/missile button in Pakistan and developing this capability in the
CARs. So is Russia worried not only over the CARs, but also Chechnya
and Dagestan. Both Israel and Russia believe that the answer to this
is not a mega missile defence project announced from the roof-top and
developed and deployed in full public knowledge. For them, the
effective answer is an accurate intelligence collection capability and a
clandestine capability to neutralise the threat on the ground before it
materialises.
Even if the USA's fears of threats from rogue States and
non-State actors is valid, is this the way to go about it as the
Administration is doing? As pointed out by many US scientists, the rogue
States would have by now shifted their attention to developing alternate
means of reaching the WMD to their targets instead of using a missile and,
even if they still intended using their missiles, they would have
developed counter-measures (decoys etc) to make the NMD/TMD
ineffective. Such alternate means and counter-measures are
available. The technology involved is not as sophisticated and not
as expensive as the technology to be used in the NMD/TMD and, hence,
affordable for them..
Or is the desire to contain China the real reason for
the NMD/TMD, as many assert? A careful reading of the plethora of
pronouncements emanating from Mr.Bush and his advisers during the last 18
months or so would indicate the outlines of a political and economic
engagement and strategic containment policy. The political and
economic engagement to be direct and the strategic containment to be
through surrogates. Japan and India figure in their thoughts as
likely surrogates.
Japan, like Israel, is already secretly collaborating
with the US in the research and development of the new defence
technologies. The Bush team would like Japan to play a more active
role in the containment of China, but is, at the same time, concerned over
the spectre of a militarily legitimised and re-energised Japan one day
assuming an adversarial role vis-�-vis the US and adding to the threats
and destabilising factors in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, a
militarily strong and active Japan might re-ignite the old fears of it in
the minds of South-East Asian nations and drive them into the embrace of
China. It is here that the attraction of India, in their eyes,
comes. In their calculation, India poses no such risks.
The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), the progenitor
of the NMD/TMD initiative, was conceived by the Reagan and Bush (Sr)
Administrations partly with a view to forcing the USSR into a
prohibitively expensive arms race and, thereby, damaging its
economy. Is the NMD/TMD initiative meant to similarly force China
into a similar costly arms race in order to weaken its economic strength,
prevent its graduation into a formidable economic competitor to the US and
set in motion the till now contained centrifugal political forces of China
in the hope of thereby pre-empting its emergence as a strategic equal to
the US in the Asia-Pacific region? China thinks so, but the US
Administration strongly denies any anti-Chinese motivation. It says
it looks upon China as a benign and not a malign competitor.
Dozens of statements on the NMD/TMD initiative issued by
China since the beginning of last year contain one message for the US and
the rest of the world loud and clear, namely:
* To China, its national security is sacrosanct.
* It would not allow it to be weakened whatever be the
cost.
* If this results in a destabilising arms race, the
responsibility would be that of the US.
What are the options open to China to maintain the
credibility of its nuclear deterrent and to preserve its national
security? Upgradation of its nuclear and missile capabilities and
development of a counter-NMD capability. A group of US scientists
has cited a CIA assessment of 1999 as cautioning the Clinton
Administration that China had already in position a counter-NMD
capability. Other reports speak of China having already embarked on
an upgradation of its missile capability. If so, of what use the yet
unproved missile defence capability, the first components of which would
be in position (Insha-Allah) only by 2004, with the other components
falling into position only by 2010?
Would the NMD/TMD enhance the USA's security?
Unlikely. On the contrary, it could provoke the rogue
elements--State or non-State-- into redoubling their attempts to find ways
of hurting the US. They are not interested in overwhelming and
destroying the US for which they would require an abundance of WMD and
missile capability. They are just interested in getting one weapon
through to a target in the US or in US bases abroad in order to hurt the
US seriously. By any means-- through the space, by air, road, sea or
train.
The pre-1998 nuclear dramatis personae were rational
thinkers. The concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) made
sense, logic to them. The very thought of it acted as a deterrent to
irresponsible or irrational policies and actions.
Since 1998, irrational elements-- State and non-State-
have joined the ranks of the nuclear dramatis personae. MAD is no
deterrent to their irrational actions. They cannot be
deterred. They can only be neutralised and, if necessary in the
interest of world peace, destroyed before they acquire the means of giving
vent to their irrationality. How to do so?
This is the most important question today for the
rational world and particularly for the US, Russia, India, China and
Israel. The Bush Administration is right in posing this question,
but the answer to this is not the NMD/TMD, but joint intelligence
collection, sharing of intelligence and joint clandestine operational
capability to neutralise/destroy the threats from irrational elements
before they assume a serious form.
India should take the lead in directing the debate and
decisions in the right direction.
A related chronology is attached.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For
Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: [email protected]
)
A Chronology
In its National Intelligence Estimate for 1995, the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US had, inter alia, ruled out any
missile threat to the US and Canada from any nation outside the declared
nuclear powers before 2011.
The CIA's assessment was confined to an evaluation of
the threat to the States of the US and Canada from nuclear and
nuclear-capable States. It did not reportedly address likely threats
to US allies and to US troops abroad and threats from non-State actors
such as Osama bin Laden's and other terrorist groups seeking weapons of
mass destruction (WMD).
The US Congress appointed a nine-member bipartisan
Commission headed by Mr.Donald Rumsfeld, the former Defence Secretary
under President Gerald Ford who has now again become Defence Secretary
under Mr.George Bush (Jr), to re-examine the CIA's threat perception.
In its report of July 1998, the Commission concluded
that the U.S. intelligence had underestimated missile threats to the US,
particularly from the so-called rogue States (now called States of
concern) such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq. The Commission
unanimously assessed that countries such as Iran, North Korea and,
eventually, Iraq, could field ballistic missiles with ''little or no
warning.''
The CIA at first stood by its 1995 conclusions. In
a July 15, 1998, letter to Congress, CIA Director George Tenet said the
intelligence community's predictions were "supported by the available
evidence and were well tested'' in an internal review. Since then,
the CIA has said it agrees that a missile threat could emerge sooner than
it had originally predicted.
The sanitised summary of the Rumsfeld Commission report
of 1998 released to the press referred to only the threats from the
so-called rogue States, but it is believed that the classified sections of
the report had also discussed the possibility of threats to the US troops
in Diego Garcia and the Gulf from Pakistani missiles should there be a
Talibanisation of Pakistan and also to US troops in the region from
non-State actors .
While Mr.Rumsfeld's chairmanship of the Congressional
Commission on missile threats was well known outside the US, the fact that
he also headed another Congressionally nominated commission to study the
use of space for national security purposes, including employing space
assets to support military operations and protecting U.S. satellites from
possible attack was not equally well known.
Addressing the Center for Security Policy, Washington,
on October 7, 1998, on the Commission's report, Mr.Rumsfeld stated as
follows:
"It is increasingly clear that anti-proliferation
efforts, coupled with the inevitable imposition of still more
sanctions--which already cover a large majority of the people on
earth--are not stopping other nations from acquiring increasingly
sophisticated weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies.
There are two schools of thought as to how to deal with this obvious
failure: One is to try still harder and impose still more sanctions.
The second approach is to seriously work to prevent the availability of
the most important technologies, try to delay the availability of the next
tier of information, but to recognize that we live in a world where those
who don't wish us well will inevitably gain sophisticated weapons, and
that, therefore, the answer is to invest as necessary in the offensive and
defense capabilities and the intelligence assets that will enable us to
live with these increasingly dangerous threats. "
In media interviews before and after the Republican
Party's convention in August last, Mr.Rumsfeld also stated as follows:
"The thing that struck me about the missile-defense
issue as it is being considered in the United States, in Russia, in China,
in Western Europe is this: If you think about it, Russia and the People's
Republic of China, along with North Korea, are the principal proliferators
of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction.
"The Russians, for example, have helped North
Korea. They are currently providing assistance to China. They are
providing assistance to Iran. They have, over a sustained period,
provided assistance to India. They have helped Iraq over time.
They are active in spreading these technologies around the world.
"So too, with China. China has helped Iran,
Pakistan, North Korea. The ironic thing is that here you have two
countries that are actively creating a more dangerous world through the
proliferation of these technologies, complaining and protesting that the
United States has decided that it thinks that it is in our best interest
to provide a capability to defend against those various
technologies. Their argument is that it is destabilizing.
"What is destabilizing is proliferation. They
are the ones who are taking an act that is causing an instability to be
injected into the world equation. Only leaders that are deluding
themselves can fail to see what's happening. And it is just beyond
comprehension why someone doesn't just call them on it. For them to
be arguing that the United States should not take steps to defend itself
against ballistic missiles from states that they have been providing
assistance to, because it's destabilizing, is on its face inconsistent.
"One thing that is new in the world equation is
that the Soviet Union does not exist. And therefore the threat of a
Soviet attack across Germany or the threat of a nuclear exchange with the
Soviet Union has diminished substantially.
"What has come up � a relatively new phenomenon
� is the fact that, given the number of years since nuclear weapons have
existed, and given the end of the Cold War and the relaxed mood around the
world, proliferation has become pervasive. With the result being, if
a country wants those capabilities, they can, in fact, over a period of
time, get them.
"Not a lot of them, and not highly accurate, and
not particularly safe. But they can get weapons that can threaten
and impose great damage on their neighbors and other countries. Now
that's a fact. What ought to be done about it? Well, at the moment,
the nations that have those are nations that have essentially been
cooperating with Russia and China because Russia and China have been
providing them assistance. They are nations that in many instances
are not friendly to the United States or Western Europe or to the United
States's friends and allies in Northeast Asia.
"So, the question is, who are they more likely to
threaten? Obviously, not China or Russia at the present time. So,
it's not surprising that Mr. Putin apparently conceded in his communiqu�
that there is in fact a growing threat from such countries in the
world. But the reality is that that threat is essentially not
against Russia or China at the present time, but much more likely against
the United States and our friends and allies around the world.
"The truth, however, is that when proliferation
starts, it tends to not stop. That is to say, if Russia helps Iran,
Iran does not necessarily have to take an oath that they'll never take
those same technologies and give them to anybody else. And over time
Iran could decide to give those technologies to someone who could in fact
threaten Russia. So Russia is playing a very dangerous game by
continuing this pattern of proliferation.
"The issue of sharing of technologies is a complex
one. It could be done in a variety of ways. At one extreme,
someone could argue that you could have a world system that would
immediately shoot down any missile that had not been previously announced
and understood to be for peaceful purposes. And it could be
independently operated. There have been people who've proposed
that. You could have a theater system that the United States could
help to use to protect a friend or an ally or a location where we have
deployed troops. So that is a sharing of the capability, as we are
discussing with Israel.
"You could have, for example, a system where the
United States might have a shared warning system, a detection system, as
opposed to a shoot-down system. So there are pieces that could be
shared. There are technologies that could be shared.
"It's an enormously complex subject, and there are
things that we would not want to share. And there are things that we
would not want jointly operated. But there are other things that we
could conceivably share or that could be jointly operated. "
Even before the Republican Party Convention of August
last, the perceptions relating to China and missile defence were touched
upon by Ms.Condoleezza Rice, Mr.Bush's present National Security Adviser,
in an article in the "Foreign Affairs" journal (January-February
2000) as well as in subsequent interviews. She said: "
Washington must begin a comprehensive discussion with Moscow on the
changing nuclear threat. Much has been made by Russian military
officials about their increased reliance on nuclear weapons in the face of
their declining conventional readiness. The Russian deterrent is
more than adequate against the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and vice versa.
But that fact need no longer be enshrined in a treaty that is almost 30
years old and is a relic of a profoundly adversarial relationship between
the United States and the Soviet Union. The Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty was intended to prevent the development of national missile
defenses in the Cold War security environment. Today, the principal
concerns are nuclear threats from the Iraqs and North Koreas of the world
and the possibility of unauthorized releases as nuclear weapons spread.
"Moscow, in fact, lives closer to those threats
than Washington does. It ought to be possible to engage the Russians
in a discussion of the changed threat environment, their possible
responses, and the relationship of strategic offensive-force reductions to
the deployment of defenses. The United States should make clear that
it prefers to move cooperatively toward a new offense-defense mix, but
that it is prepared to do so unilaterally. Moscow should understand,
too, that any possibilities for sharing technology or information in these
areas would depend heavily on its record -- problematic to date -- on the
proliferation of ballistic-missile and other technologies related to
WMD. It would be foolish in the extreme to share defenses with
Moscow if it either leaks or deliberately transfers weapons technologies
to the very states against which America is defending.
" As to the ABM treaty, the Governor has made clear
that we are in a new environment -- post-Cold War-- and that he intends to
approach the Russians about fundamental changes to the ABM treaty to
permit the building of defenses. Diplomacy is the art of the hard,
and no one suggests that it will be easy. But it is in America's and
her allies' interests to find a new way of dealing with nuclear weapons,
both offensive and defensive. "
In July 2000,a Commission on America's National
Interests, established by a group of Americans with the help of well-known
US think-tanks such as Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, the Nixon Center, the RAND and the Hauser
Foundation released a report identifying the US national interests that
should receive the attention of the new US Administration .
The Commission was jointly chaired by Mr.Robert
Ellsworth of the Hamilton Technology Ventures, L.P., Mr.Andrew Goodpaster
of the Eisenhower World Affairs Institute and Ms.Rita Hauser of the Hauser
Foundation and included, amongst its members, Mr. Richard Armitage, now
the Deputy Secretary of State, Ms.Rice, and Mr.Brent Scowcroft, National
Security Adviser under Mr.George Bush (Sr), whom Ms.Rice once described as
amongst her mentors.
Amongst the vital US national interests identified by
the Commission were :
* That the nuclear danger to the US be reduced to the
achievable minimum.
* That there be no nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons attacks on the United States or against its military forces
abroad.
* That there be no further proliferation or build-up
of WMD capabilities in countries hostile to the United States (e.g.,
Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya).
* That no country acquire new or build up existing
intercontinental-range strategic nuclear capabilities.
* That all global stockpiles of nuclear weapons and
weapons-usable nuclear material be maintained in conditions of security,
safety, and accountability.
* That the safety and reliability of the US nuclear
stockpile be assured.
The report said: "There is an emerging consensus
within the US national security community that the greatest source of
direct threat to US national interests stems from the proliferation of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their delivery systems to
hostile states and non-state actors. This view is correct.
Because of its geographic position, the United States is highly secure
from conventional forms of attack. Only weapons of mass destruction
offer US adversaries a powerful way to strike America's cities and
citizens. Moreover, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
poses profound challenges to the US government as it seeks to advance or
protect other interests in distant regions. With its immense
conventional military superiority, the only current real threats to US
military forces abroad are adversaries equipped with, and prepared to use
effectively, nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. These facts force
WMD proliferation to the center of any US assessment of the threats to US
national interests.
"Clearly the highest aim of US national security
policy should be to prevent nuclear or biological weapons attacks against
American cities and civilians, or American military forces abroad.
While the shape of the biological weapons threat is only beginning to
emerge, the nuclear threat had been familiar in the form of the Soviet
strategic nuclear arsenal. The disappearance of the Soviet Union and
the accompanying collapse of its command-and-control state have presented
today a new nuclear challenge. As a result of the disintegration of
the Soviet Union, the risks of one or a dozen nuclear devices being
exploded in an American city have increased. Today the most serious threat
to vital American interests is the threat that loose nuclear weapons and
fissile material from the former Soviet Union will fall into the hands of
pariah states or terrorist or criminal groups.
"Preventing the proliferation of nuclear and
biological weapons to countries and entities that wish America ill must
take priority over controlling proliferation to friendly, democratic
countries."
In an interview given to the Council on Foreign
Relations on July 31,2000, Mr.Robert Blackwill, the US
Ambassador-designate to India, who was also associated with the work of
this Commission, elaborated on Mr.Bush's perceptions as follows:
"One of Governor Bush's most important initiatives
in the past few months has been his call to move decisively beyond the
Cold War to modify American policy toward nuclear weapons. There are
two dimensions of this. First, the Governor believes that an effective
American ballistic missile defense should be deployed at the earliest
possible time. Such a defense should protect the American homeland,
American forces overseas, and our allies and friends. This concept
is designed to deal with the rapidly emerging threat from rogue state
ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction. It makes
no sense -- indeed it is not moral -- for an American President to be so
captivated by an arms control treaty negotiated 30 years ago that he does
not fulfill his Constitutional obligation to protect the American people.
"On the offensive side, Governor Bush has stressed
that calculating the level of American strategic nuclear weapons in
relationship to the Russian nuclear arsenal is an antique idea -- Cold War
old think. No one believes that the United States and the Russian
Federation are going to nuclear war with one another. Therefore, the
Governor has indicated that if elected President he will direct a
fundamental review of the requirements of American nuclear deterrence and
bring down the U.S. nuclear arsenal to the lowest possible number
consistent with U.S. national security. "
A careful reading of the various statements made by
Mr.Bush and his advisers before his election indicate that their main
perceptions are as follows:
* The characterisation of China as a strategic competitor
does not imply a downgrading of the importance attached by the US to its
relations with China and to the need for strengthening and further
developing its economic and political engagement with China.
* Like the Clinton Administration, the Bush
administration too views China as a responsible power, which has till
now shown a willingness to act within accepted international
norms. At the same time, it views with concern China's policies
relating to Taiwan and the South China Sea and the Chinese perception of
the US presence in the region as not totally benign and as possibly
detrimental to its own interests.
* In its view, there are no signs of any significant
upgradation of China's missile capability (ICBMs) vis-�-vis the
membere-States of the USA, but is concerned over China's reported
upgradation of its capability vis-�-vis Taiwan and other US allies in
the region. Such a capability also poses a threat to the US troops based
in the region.
* Of greater concern is China's role in assisting
North Korea, Pakistan and Iran and possible missile threats to the US
and its troops in Asia from North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya.
While the new Bush doctrine has been projected as mainly directed
against likely missile threats from these rogue states and China has not
been projected as a threat, it is believed that the Bush doctrine is
directed as much ( if not more) against China as against the rogue
states.
One could perceive the contours of the emerging policy
of the Bush Administration as follows:
* While continuing to support the one-China policy, it
apprehends that any Chinese success in the forcible unification of
Taiwan with the mainland could destroy the credibility of the US
leadership in the region. It is, therefore, determined to
neutralise Chinese missile capability vis-�-vis Taiwan through the TMD
cover for it.
* It contemplates following a policy of political and
economic engagement with and strategic containment of China.
* While the engagement would be direct, it would
prefer to have surrogates in the implementation of its containment
policy. Japan and India assume importance in this regard.
* While it would like Japan to play a more active
role, it is at the same time concerned that a militarily legitimised and
re-energised Japan could one day assume an adversarial role vis-�-vis
the US and rekindle the fears of the other countries of the region,
thereby driving them closer to China.
In its eyes, India has the advantage of not posing any of
these risks.
Bush's Statement of May 1,2001
The following are the salient points of the speech on
the new security paradigm made by President Bush at the National Defence
University, Washington, on May 1:
* "Today's world requires a new policy, a broad
strategy of active nonproliferation, counter proliferation and
defenses. We must work together with other like-minded nations to
deny weapons of terror from those seeking to acquire them. We must
work with allies and friends who wish to join with us to defend against
the harm they can inflict. And together we must deter anyone who
would contemplate their use.
* "We need new concepts of deterrence that rely
on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer
be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Defenses can
strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation.
* "We need a new framework that allows us to
build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's
world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30
year old ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present,
or point us to the future. It enshrines the past. No treaty that
prevents us from addressing today's threats, that prohibits us from
pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our
allies is in our interests or in the interests of world peace.
* "This new framework must encourage still
further cuts in nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons still have a
vital role to play in our security and that of our allies. We can,
and will, change the size, the composition, the character of our nuclear
forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over.
* "I am committed to achieving a credible
deterrent with the lowest-possible number of nuclear weapons consistent
with our national security needs, including our obligations to our
allies. My goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces.
* "The Secretary (Mr.Rumsfeld) has identified
near-term options that could allow us to deploy an initial capability
against limited threats. In some cases, we can draw on already
established technologies that might involve land-based and sea-based
capabilities to intercept missiles in mid-course or after they re-enter
the atmosphere. We also recognize the substantial advantages of
intercepting missiles early in their flight, especially in the boost
phase. The preliminary work has produced some promising options
for advanced sensors and interceptors that may provide this
capability. If based at sea or on aircraft, such approaches could
provide limited, but effective, defenses. We have more work to do
to determine the final form the defenses might take.
* "We'll also need to reach out to other
interested states, including China and Russia. Russia and the
United States should work together to develop a new foundation for world
peace and security in the 21st century. We should leave behind the
constraints of an ABM Treaty that perpetuates a relationship based on
distrust and mutual vulnerability. This Treaty ignores the
fundamental breakthroughs in technology during the last 30 years.
It prohibits us from exploring all options for defending against the
threats that face us, our allies and other countries.
* "That's why we should work together to replace
this Treaty with a new framework that reflects a clear and clean break
from the past, and especially from the adversarial legacy of the Cold
War. This new cooperative relationship should look to the future,
not to the past. It should be reassuring, rather than
threatening. It should be premised on openness, mutual confidence
and real opportunities for cooperation, including the area of missile
defense. It should allow us to share information so that each
nation can improve its early warning capability, and its capability to
defend its people and territory. And perhaps one day, we can even
cooperate in a joint defense.
* "I want to complete the work of changing our
relationship from one based on a nuclear balance of terror, to one based
on common responsibilities and common interests. We may have areas
of difference with Russia, but we are not and must not be strategic
adversaries. Russia and America both face new threats to
security. Together, we can address today's threats and pursue
today's opportunities. We can explore technologies that have the
potential to make us all safer."
How Exactly will the Missle Defence System be
Organised?
A study published by the "China Daily" on July
7,2000, projected the NMD, as envisaged by the Clinton Administration, as
follows:
* "The objective of the National Missile Defense
(NMD) program is to develop and maintain the option to deploy a cost
effective, operationally effective system that will protect the United
States against limited ballistic missile threats, including accidental
or unauthorized launches or Third World threats.
* "The primary mission of National Missile
Defense is defense of the United States (all 50 states) against a threat
of a limited strategic ballistic missile attack from a rogue
nation. Such a system would also provide some capability against a
small accidental or unauthorized launch of strategic ballistic missiles
from more nuclear capable states.
* "The means to accomplish the NMD mission are as
follows:
*"Field an NMD system that meets the ballistic
missile threat at the time of a deployment decision.
* "Detect the launch of enemy ballistic
missile(s) and track.
* "Continue tracking of ballistic missile(s)
using ground based radars. Engage and destroy the ballistic
missile warhead above the earth's atmosphere by force of impact.
* "The National Missile Defense Program was
originally a technology development effort. In 1996, at the
direction of the Secretary of Defense, NMD was designated a Major
Defense Acquisition Program and transitioned to an acquisition
effort. Concurrently, Department of Defence was tasked with
developing a deployable system within three years. This three-year
development period was to culminate in the year 2000, when there was to
be a DOD Deployment Readiness Review to review technical readiness of
NMD elements. Because the three-year deployment planning period is
combined with an additional three-year deployment option, the total
effort is referred to as the NMD 3+3 program. The decision to be
made is whether to deploy an NMD system.
* "This decision was to be based on the analysis
of the potential ballistic missile threat to the United States,
technical readiness of the NMD system for deployment, projected cost to
build and operate the NMD system, and other factors including potential
environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.
If the decision is to deploy, then sites would be selected from the
range of alternatives studied. Should the deployment option not be
exercised in the year 2000, NMD will continue development of technology
enhancements for NMD elements.
* "The NMD system would be a fixed, land-based,
non-nuclear missile defense system with a space-based detection system,
consisting of five elements:
* "Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs)
* "Battle Management, Command, Control, and
Communications (BMC3), which includes: Battle Management, Command, and
Control (BMC2), and In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS)
* "X-Band Radars (XBRs)
*"Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR)
* "Defense Support Program satellites/Space-Based
Infrared System (SBIRS)
* "All elements of the NMD system would work
together to respond to a ballistic missile directed against the United
States."
The US media reported on May 3 that despite technical
hurdles and promises to consult Russia, China and skeptical allies, the
Bush administration was already studying possible deployment of a limited
anti-missile defense as early as 2004. They also reported as
follows:
* While no plan or date had been decided, Mr. Rumsfeld
was looking at options like stationing 10 fledgling missile interceptors
in Alaska in three years, later expanding that battery and perhaps
adding sea- and space-based arms. The proposed
"hit-to-kill" interceptors for Alaska have failed two of their
last three space tests.
* Other anti-missile batteries based on U.S.Aegis
warships might be deployed as early as 2005, but airborne and
space-based lasers are believed to be two to five years further behind.
* Mr.Rumsfeld said he was undaunted by the initial
failures and that he was studying options given to him by the Pentagon's
missile defense office. "There is no question but that the
use of land and sea and air and space are all things that need to be
considered if one is looking at the best way to provide the kind of
security from ballistic missiles that is desirable for the United States
and for our friends and allies," he said.
* He made clear that President Bush felt that the
Clinton administration had too narrowly focused on a ground-based
defense on remote Shemya Island in Alaska to destroy a limited number of
missiles fired by rogue nations or accidentally launched by Russia or
China. "There are somewhat more than several things that had
not been fully explored and that we will be discussing in our
consultations on Capitol Hill and with our allies and with Russia and
with China in the weeks ahead. The ballistic missile office has
developed these options and they are being examined and looked at and
they will be discussed during the consultations.
* Costs of the plan revolving around the Alaska base
proposed by Mr. Bill Clinton had ranged from $30 billion to $60 billion,
but the expanded considerations of the new administration could push
that beyond $200 billion.
*Navy officials said that the Navy could have two
cruisers armed with up to 50 SM-3 interceptor missiles ready by 2005 at
a cost of up to $1.4 billion. Other defense officials, who also
asked not to be identified, said Mr.Rumsfeld was considering missile
defense budget increases totaling more than $8 billion in the next
several years, much of it for accelerated development of a missile
burning laser weapon mounted on a modified Air Force aircraft.
Talking to pressmen before Mr.Bush's speech, Mr.Rumsfeld
stated as follows:
* Any initial missile defense deployed by the United
States is unlikely to be perfect, but would sow doubt among enemies and
dissuade them from attack.
* "What we are talking about here is a new set of
capabilities ... to dissuade or deter as well as to defend against a
growing threat in the world. And they need not be 100 percent
perfect in my opinion. And they are certainly unlikely to be in
their early stages of evolution.
* "Anyone who believes that you can have a
full-blown, perfect system from the beginning, I think, is
underestimating the difficulties of doing anything that is
technologically challenging."
* The Defense Department should consider not only the
unfailing ability to shoot down missiles, but the prospect for deterring
missile attacks through creating doubt about the success of launching
such a strike. "There are 10 or 12 things that can be
explored. Some of them won't work, some will."
* Mr.Rumsfeld also dismissed concern that U.S. plans
to proceed with a missile defense system might increase instability or
prompt China to build more intercontinental ballistic missiles that
could potentially reach the United States. "They are going to
build more , quite apart from the ABM treaty," he said, noting that
China had not signed the treaty.
The feasibility and effectiveness of the missile defence
system have been widely doubted in the US itself on the ground that
counter-measures to neutralise NMD/TMD are possible; that such
counter-measures would be even less expensive than the NMD/TMD; that
according to a CIA estimate of 1999, China has already embarked on a
programme of counter-measures; such counter-measures should be available
to the rogue States too; and that the only net result of deploying the
missile system would be to damage even the existing international
co-operation towards non-proliferation. The critics were of the view
that while strengthening the existing international co-operation, the US
should explore the possibility of destroying the WMD/missile capability of
rogue States on the ground even before they could assemble and use them.
In a report of April, 2000, a group of US scientists and
engineers calling themselves the Union of Concerned Scientists said as
follows:
* "The planned NMD system could be defeated by
technically simple countermeasures. Such countermeasures would be
available to any emerging missile state that deploys a long-range
ballistic missile.
* "There are numerous tactics that an attacker
could use to counter the planned NMD system. None of these
countermeasures is new; indeed, most of these ideas are as old as
ballistic missiles themselves.
* "All countries that have deployed long-range
ballistic missiles (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United
States) have developed, produced, and in some cases, deployed,
countermeasures for their missiles. There is no reason to believe
that emerging missile states would behave differently, especially when
US missile defense development is front-page news.
* "Many highly effective countermeasures require
a lower level of technology than that required to build a long-range
ballistic missile (or nuclear weapon). The United States must
anticipate that any potentially hostile country developing or acquiring
ballistic missiles would have a parallel program to develop or acquire
countermeasures to make those missiles effective in the face of US
missile defenses. Countermeasure programs could be concealed from US
intelligence much more easily than missile programs, and the United
States should not assume that a lack of intelligence evidence is
evidence that countermeasure programs do not exist.
* Many countermeasures are based on basic physical
principles and well-understood technologies. As a consequence, a
vast amount of technical information relevant to building and deploying
countermeasures is publicly available. Any country capable of
building a long-range ballistic missile would have the scientific and
technical expertise, including people who have worked on missiles for
many years, to exploit the available technologies. Moreover, a
great deal of technical information about the planned NMD system and its
sensors has been published. A potential attacker could learn from
a variety of open sources enough about the planned NMD system to design
countermeasures to defeat it.
* "To determine whether technically simple
countermeasures would be effective against the planned NMD system, we
examined three potential countermeasures in detail: sub munitions with
biological or chemical weapons, nuclear warheads with anti-simulation
balloon decoys, and nuclear warheads with cooled shrouds. We find
that any of these would defeat the planned NMD system. They would
either significantly degrade the effectiveness of the defense or make it
fail completely. Moreover, these countermeasures would defeat the
planned NMD system even if they were anticipated by the United States.
And because these countermeasures use readily available materials and
straightforward technologies, any emerging missile state could readily
construct and employ them.
* "Submunitions with Biological or Chemical
Weapons. To deliver biological or chemical weapons by long-range
ballistic missile, an attacker could divide the agent for each missile
among a hundred or more small warheads, or submunitions, that would be
released shortly after boost phase. These submunitions would be
too numerous for a limited defense -- such as the planned NMD system --
to even attempt to intercept all of them.
* "Our analysis demonstrates that the attacker
could readily keep the reentry heating of the submunitions low enough to
protect the agents from excessive heat. Moreover, because submunitions
would distribute the agent over a large area and disseminate it at low
speeds, they would be a more effective means of delivering biological
and chemical agents by ballistic missile than would a single large
warhead. Thus, an attacker would have a strong incentive to use
submunitions, aside from any concerns about missile defenses.
* "Nuclear Weapons with Anti-simulation Balloon
Decoys. Anti-simulation is a powerful tactic in which the attacker
disguises the warhead to make it look like a decoy, rather than
attempting the more difficult task of making every decoy closely
resemble a specific warhead. To use this tactic, the attacker
could place a nuclear warhead in a lightweight balloon made of
aluminized mylar and release it along with a large number of similar,
but empty balloons. The balloon containing the warhead could be
made indistinguishable from the empty ones to all the defense sensors --
including the ground-based radars, the satellite-based infrared sensors,
and the sensors on the kill vehicle. The defense would therefore
need to shoot at all the balloons to prevent the warhead from getting
through, but the attacker could deploy so many balloons that the defense
would run out of interceptors.
* "Nuclear Weapons with Cooled Shrouds. The
attacker could cover a nuclear warhead with a shroud cooled to a low
temperature by liquid nitrogen. The cooled shroud would reduce the
infrared radiation emitted by the warhead by a factor of at least one
million. This would make it nearly impossible for the kill
vehicle�s heat-seeking infrared sensors to detect the warhead at a
great enough distance to have time to maneuver to hit it.
* "Many operational and technical factors make
the job of the defense more difficult than that of the attacker.
First, the defense must commit to a specific technology and architecture
before the attacker does. This permits the attacker to tailor its
countermeasures to the specific defense system. Second, the job of
the defense is technically much more complex and difficult than that of
the offense. This is especially true for defenses using
hit-to-kill interceptors, for which there is little margin for
error. Third, the defense must work the first time it is
used. Fourth, the requirements on defense effectiveness are very
high for a system intended to defend against nuclear and biological
weapons -- much higher than the requirements on offense
effectiveness. These inherent offensive advantages would enable an
attacker to compensate for US technical superiority.
* "The planned NMD system would not be effective
against an accidental or unauthorized attack from Russia, or an
erroneous launch based on false warning of a US attack. Russia has
indicated it would respond to a US NMD deployment by deploying
countermeasures on its ballistic missiles. As a result, if an
accidental, unauthorized, or erroneous Russian attack should occur, the
missiles launched would have countermeasures that would defeat the
planned NMD system. Moreover, because of the structure of its
command system, an unauthorized Russian attack could easily involve 50
or even 500 warheads, which would overwhelm a limited defense. An
erroneous attack would likely be large and would also overwhelm a
limited defense.
* "The planned NMD system would not be effective
against a Chinese attack. China has also indicated it would take
steps to permit it to penetrate the planned NMD system. China
would likely respond by deploying more long-range missiles capable of
reaching the United States. More significantly, as the 1999
National Intelligence Estimate notes, China has developed numerous
countermeasures. The United States must therefore expect that any
Chinese ballistic missile attack -- whether using existing or new
missiles -- would be accompanied by effective countermeasures.
* "Long-range missiles would be neither the only
nor the optimum means of delivery for an emerging missile state
attacking the United States with nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons. Other delivery options available to emerging missile
states would be less expensive, more reliable, and more accurate than
long-range missiles. Moreover, these means could be covertly
developed and employed, so that the United States might be unable to
identify the attacker and retaliate. These alternative methods of
delivery include cruise missiles or short-range ballistic missiles
launched from ships off the US coast,nuclear weapons detonated in a US
port while still in a shipping container in a cargo ship, and cars or
trucks disseminating chemical or biological agents as they are driven
through a city.
* "Available evidence strongly suggests that the
Pentagon has greatly underestimated the ability and motivation of
emerging missile states to deploy effective countermeasures. There
are strong indications that the Pentagon�s Systems Threat Assessment
Requirement (STAR) Document and Operational Requirements Document, which
describe the type of threat the NMD system must defend against,
underestimate the effectiveness of the countermeasures that an emerging
missile state could deploy and thus inaccurately describe the actual
threat. If the threat assessment and requirements documents do not
accurately reflect the real-world threat, then an NMD system designed
and built to meet these less demanding requirements will fail in the
real world.
* "The planned testing program for the NMD system
is inadequate to assess the operational effectiveness of the
system. A judgement that the planned NMD system can work against
realistic countermeasures must be based on sound analysis of the
performance of the planned system against feasible countermeasures
designed to defeat it. Should such an analysis indicate that the
NMD system may be able to deal with such countermeasures, a rigorous
testing program that incorporates realistic countermeasures should be
created to assess the operational effectiveness of the planned NMD
system. The United States should demonstrate that the system could
overcome such countermeasures before a deployment decision is
made. Because it may be difficult or impossible to obtain direct
information about the countermeasure programs of other states, the
United States must rely on other means -- particularly on "red
team" programs that develop countermeasures using technology
available to emerging missile states -- to assess the countermeasure
capabilities of potential attackers. However, existing red team programs
are under the financial control and authority of the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization and thus face a fundamental conflict of
interest. To permit a meaningful assessment of the operational
effectiveness of the NMD system, the NMD testing program should be
restructured. The testing program must ensure that the baseline
threat is realistically defined by having the STAR document reviewed by
an independent panel of qualified experts, conduct tests against the
most effective countermeasures that an emerging missile state could
reasonably be expected to build, use an independent red team to design
and build these countermeasures, and employ them in tests without the
defense having advance knowledge of the countermeasure characteristics,
conduct enough tests against countermeasures to determine the
effectiveness of the system with high confidence, and provide for
objective assessment of the design and results of the testing program by
an independent standing review committee.
* "Past US missile defense tests against missiles
using "countermeasures" did not demonstrate that defenses
could defeat such countermeasures. The United States has conducted
several missile defense flight tests of exoatmospheric hit-to-kill
interceptors that included decoys or other countermeasures and that have
been described as demonstrating that the defense could defeat the
countermeasures. However, in every case in which the defense was
able to distinguish the mock warhead from the decoys, it was only
because it knew in advance what the distinguishing characteristics of
the different objects would be. These tests reveal nothing about
whether the defense could distinguish the warhead in a real attack, in
which an attacker could disguise the warhead and deploy decoys that did
not have distinguishing characteristics.
* "NMD deployment would result in large security
costs to the United States. By deploying an ineffective NMD
system, the United States would stimulate responses that would produce a
net decrease in its national security. Deployment would make it
far more difficult to reduce the greatest threat to the security of the
United States: an accidental, unauthorized, or erroneous attack from
Russia. Current US and Russian nuclear weapons deployment and
operational policies, which remain largely unchanged since the end of
the cold war, carry a risk of accidental, unauthorized, or erroneous
attack on the United States. Today, such an attack poses the
gravest threat to the United States: it would likely result in the
deaths of millions of Americans. Even a deliberate nuclear attack
by an emerging missile state would result in far fewer deaths and
injuries. If the United States deploys its planned NMD system,
Russia is likely to increase its reliance on a launch-on-warning
strategy, thereby heightening the risk of accidental, unauthorized, or
erroneous attack. As Russia has made clear, a US NMD deployment
would also limit deep reductions in Russian nuclear weapons, thereby
insuring that this threat to US security continues into the
future. Deployment would also limit US-Russian cooperation on
reducing the dangers posed by Russian nuclear weapons and the risk of
theft of Russian nuclear materials. US deployment will affect both
the pace and scale of China�s missile modernization program, and is
likely to lead China to build up both faster and to higher levels than
it otherwise would. The adverse implications of NMD deployment by
the US would extend beyond the direct responses by Russia and
China. The deployment of the NMD system could seriously impair
efforts to control the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles
and weapons of mass destruction, and thus ultimately increase the threat
to the United States from these weapons. Controlling proliferation of
these weapons requires the cooperation of Russia and China, which, as
the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate stated, will be influenced by
their perceptions of US ballistic missile defenses. Moreover, as long as
the United States and Russia rely on nuclear deterrence, NMD deployment
would place a floor on US-Russian nuclear arms reductions, and thereby
put at risk the survival of the broader arms control and
non-proliferation regimes. Statements by key US allies reflect
their concerns that NMD deployment would decrease international security
as well as complicate relations within NATO.
* "Deterrence will continue to be the ultimate
line of defense against attacks on the United States by missiles armed
with weapons of mass destruction. The United States, in concert
with other countries, can reduce the missile threat through a
combination of export controls and various cooperative measures.
If a hostile emerging missile state acquires intercontinental-range
missiles, the United States can deter their use through the threat of
overwhelming retaliation. If such a state makes an explicit and
credible threat to launch a missile attack against the United States, it
may be possible to destroy its missiles before they are launched, in
accord with the right of self-defense. The only practical and
effective way to address the Russian and Chinese missile threat to the
United States is through cooperation, and the deployment of the planned
NMD system may limit such cooperation."
Chinese Reaction
There has been a large number of Chinese reactions
against the NMD and TMD. Suffice to cite two of them, which are
comprehensive and cover all the points.
The White Paper on national defence issued by the
Chinese Government in November 2000 said:
* "In view of the fact that the US is accelerating
its efforts for the development and possible deployment of a national
missile defense system and space weapons, and that the US and Russia
still possess nuclear arsenals large enough to destroy the world many
times over, it is China's position that continued nuclear disarmament
and the prevention of an arms race in outer space are multilateral fora
of arms control that should be given more priority than the FMCT
negotiations. Therefore, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
should not emphasize the importance of only the FMCT negotiations to the
neglect of the issues of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an
arms race in outer space, and should, at the minimum, give equal
attention to all three issues by carrying out its substantive work in a
balanced manner.
* "The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems (hereafter referred to as the ABM Treaty) plays a very
important role in maintaining the global strategic balance and
stability, promoting nuclear disarmament and enhancing international
security. However, in recent years the United States has
accelerated its development of a national missile defense system in
disregard of the relevant provisions of the ABM Treaty and the
opposition of the international community. China expresses its
strong opposition to such moves on the part of the United States, for
they will undermine the global strategic balance, severely hamper the
nuclear disarmament process and international non-proliferation efforts,
jeopardize global peace and regional stability, and may even touch off a
new round of arms race.
*"The Resolution on the Preservation of and
Compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, co-sponsored by
China, Russia and Belarus, and adopted at the 54th Session of the UN
General Assembly with an overwhelming majority, called upon the parties
to the ABM Treaty to refrain from the deployment of anti-ballistic
missile systems for the defense of their territories. It also
expressed support for further efforts by the international community to
safeguard the inviolability and integrity of the ABM Treaty. The
Resolution is a clear manifestation of the international community's
opposition to US efforts to develop and deploy missile defense systems,
and of its will to safeguard the ABM Treaty.
* "On July 18,2000, President Jiang Zemin of the
PRC and President Putin of the Russian Federation signed a joint
statement on anti-missile defense. In the statement, the Presidents
reaffirm that the ABM Treaty remains the cornerstone of global strategic
stability and international security, and constitutes the basis for a
framework of the key international agreements designed to reduce and
limit offensive strategic weapons and to prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. Emphasizing that it is totally
untenable to press for amending the ABM Treaty on the pretext of
so-called missile threats from some countries, the Presidents point out
that to amend the text of the ABM Treaty is tantamount to an act of
undermining the ABM Treaty and will inevitably bring about a series of
negative consequences, and that the country which presses for amending
this treaty will have to bear the full responsibility for all these
consequences. The Presidents also reiterate that under the current
strategic situation, it is of great practical significance to preserve
the integrity and effectiveness of the ABM Treaty.
* "The United States government should earnestly
heed the appeal of the international community and stop the development
and deployment of missile defense systems that may undermine global
strategic stability. The joint research and development of the
theater missile defense (TMD) system by the United States and Japan with
a view to deploying it in East Asia will enhance the overall offensive
and defensive capability of the US-Japan military alliance to an
unprecedented level, which will also far exceed the defensive needs of
Japan. This will touch off a regional arms race and jeopardize
security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. China expresses
its profound concern over such a development.
* "China is strongly opposed to the provision of
the TMD system, its components and technology, and any such assistance
to Taiwan. China is also strongly against any attempt to
incorporate Taiwan in any form into the TMD system by any country."
Briefing pressmen at Beijing on March 14,2001, Sha
Zukang, Director- General of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department
of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, stated as follows:
* "China does not want to see a confrontation
between China and the US over the NMD issue nor an arms race between the
two countries. We are against NMD, not because we intend to
threaten the security of the US with our nuclear weapons. We just
hope that the existing mutual deterrence between the two countries can
be preserved.
* "China's nuclear arsenal is the smallest and
least advanced among the five nuclear powers, and yet China is the first
to pursue the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. China
will not allow its legitimate means of self-defense to be weakened or
even taken away by anyone in anyway. This is one of the most important
aspects of China's national security.
* "It is no news that China is opposed to the US
NMD program. For two basic reasons: firstly, we don't believe that
NMD is in the interest of international peace and security as a whole;
secondly, it will compromise China's security.
* "The US NMD program will have a series of
far-reaching negative consequences for the international security
environment. The US NMD program will jeopardize the global
strategic balance and stability, and undermine the mutual trust and
cooperation among major powers.
* "The significance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) treaty lies in the fact that, by prohibiting the deployment of
nation-wide missile defense systems, it has maintained the strategic
balance between the two nuclear superpowers, and by extension, has
maintained the strategic balance among all the nuclear-weapon
states. The US development and possible deployment of NMD will
disrupt the existing strategic equilibrium among major powers, and
jeopardize the security interest of other countries. This will
undoubtedly arouse suspicion and mistrust among major powers, hampering
their coordination and cooperation in international security affairs.
* "The US NMD program will hamper the
international arms control and disarmament process and even trigger a
new round of arms race. As the only remaining superpower, the US
already possesses the largest and most advanced arsenal in the world,
nuclear and conventional. In addition, the US pursues a nuclear
deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons. Under
such circumstances, NMD will become a multiplier of the US strategic
offensive force.
* "The NMD program is, in essence, an US program
of unilateral nuclear expansion, which harbors the inherent danger of
triggering an arms race at a higher level. To be specific, it may
start off an arms race in outer space, and may also extend the arms race
from offensive weapons to defensive weapons.
* "The US NMD program will undermine the
international non-proliferation regime and efforts, though the US claims
that its development of missile defense systems is intended to counter
the increasing threats posed by missile proliferation.
* "I for one, and I don't think I'm alone, do not
share the US assessment of the missile threats. The US has at
least over-exaggerated the missile threats from the so- called
"countries of concern". In my view, the development of
NMD is tantamount to drinking poison to quench thirst.
* "NMD is not a solution to missile proliferation
but will only undercut the very foundation of the international
non-proliferation regime, and even stimulate further proliferation of
missiles. The US NMD program will increase the weight of the
military factor in international relations in detriment to international
peace and security.
* "The international debate around the NMD issue
is, in essence, about what kind of international order should be
established, and a choice between unipolar and multipolar world.
More and more people have come to realize that the real motive behind
the US NMD program is to seek its own absolute security. Once the
NMD is deployed, whether it is effective or not, it would further
strengthen the US tendency towards unilateralism, and the tendency to
use or threaten to use force.
* "As a result, military factor will play a
bigger role in international relations, and huge amount of financial
resources and materials that would otherwise be devoted to economic
development will be diverted to arms buildup. Under such circumstances,
how can a country enjoy real security? How can the world remain stable?
* "The implementation of NMD program by the US
will not only undermine global strategic balance and stability, but also
disrupt efforts for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.
Moreover, the US also intends to deploy the Theater Missile Defence
(TMD) system in the region.
* "Though research and development of TMD itself
may not necessarily constitute a violation of the ABM treaty, the
crucial question is how large is the scale and what are the nature and
function of the TMD that the US is preparing to deploy in Asia? If this
TMD can be used as part of NMD and constitute the front deployment of
NMD in the region, its negative impact on regional security and
stability will be no less than the NMD itself."
