INDIA�S CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF: a perspective analysis
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
The views expressed are those of the author - Director
India�s National Security Review: Successive Indian Government in
the last 53 years paid lip service to a review of India�s national
security requirements in terms of higher organisational structures and
roles. Any serious effort was stymied by the entrenched civilian
bureaucracy which was opposed to let go their bureaucratic control of the
armed forces and especially defence procurement. Preying on Nehru�s
suspicions of Indian Armed Forces, the civilian bureaucracy by an
innocuous government note on May 27, 1952 declared the Armed Forces
Headquarters as "attached office" of the Defence Ministry.
In one stroke the bureaucracy divested the Armed Forces Headquarters of
policy-making roles as the Government manual of office procedures decreed
that while Ministry of Defence could make policy, their "attached
offices" merely implemented it. [1]
The BJP Govt�s National Security Review declared on May 11, 2001 was a
bold path-breaking step, especially in terms of acceptance of the
requirement of a Chief of Defence Staff(CDS) for India.
Significance of Review: The noted defence analyst, K. Subrahmanyam,
himself a former bureaucrat highlights the significance of this review by
giving credit to the present Government on three counts:[2]
* The Government broke the taboo of 53 years on review of national
security matters. This precedent will enable periodic reviews in
the future.
* The reform process of national security requirements was preceded
by intense debate at political level. This has helped in
"cutting through the Gordian knot of sequential bureaucratic
nitpicking and consequent delays."
* Recommendations and supporting arguments of the review are being
published. This will add to transparency in discussion of India�s
national security matters.
The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)- Role Envisaged By The Government:
Detailed charter of duties of the CDS has yet to be spelt out by the
Government. Media reports convey that the role of the CDS envisaged
by the Government is:[3]
* CDS will be the single-point military advisor to the Government
from any of the three Services and will be of four-star rank.
* CDS will head India�s Strategic Forces Command as well as the
tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Command
* The most important peace-time job would be to reconcile budgetary
and equipment demands of the three services.
Chief of Defence Staff: Role Determinants: While many models of the
role of CDS exist in Western democracies, India�s strategic environment
and requirements are different. While these models can serve as
guidelines, the Government has to bear in mind the following determinants
of the role of India�s CDS:
* Strategic and defence expertise still remains in the domain
exclusively of the uniformed fraternity, despite the growing emergence
of civilian experts in the academic field.
* India�s land borders and threats are predominantly land-based and
oriented. Despite technological advances India�s defence requirements
would be man-power extensive based on the Indian Army.
*The Indian working ethos is hierarchical based. It does not admit
the Western concept of �first amongst equals�.
* India�s strategic weaknesses that have emerged in the wars since
1947 centre on lack of war preparedness, poor intelligence and crippling
processing of defence requirements.
* Internal security threats are overtaking requirements of defence
against armed aggression. These entail extensive use of the Indian Army
during peace time in internal security operations.
Ideal Role of the Indian Chief of Defence Staff: The above
determinants and other lessons of the past in India�s strategic
shortcomings would suggest that the ideal role for India�s CDS should
incorporate:
* CDS should have the primary role of being the Principal Advisor to
the Prime Minister and the Government through the Defence Minister on
all matters pertaining to India�s national security in the spheres of
strategy and strategic planning, both conventional and nuclear. In
effect he should be on par with the National Security Adviser in terms
of access to the Prime Minister.
* CDS should provide �strategic vision� and be responsible for
all strategic perspective planning, operational planning and contingency
planning. This would stipulate that the CDS should not be weighed down
by any day-to-day administrative responsibilities pertaining to the
three Services.
* In peace-time, the primary role of CDS should focus exclusively on
war preparedness and internal security operations having a bearing on
strategic operations.
* In terms of war preparedness, the CDS should have a major role in
refinement and integration of operational plans, creation of logistic
means to sustain operational plans and ensuring build-up of strategic
reserves of arms, ammunition, military hardware, supplies and fuel
requirements.
* Procurement should not rest with the CDS as this would weigh him
down with bureaucratic and administrative requirements. This would
distract him from the primary roles outlined above.
* The CDS should prepare the annual National Intelligence Estimate
and the requirements of national intelligence to meet the existent
threats, overall.
* The CDS rightly has been envisaged as heading the Strategic Forces
Command and the Andamans and Nicobar Command and any other tri-service
commands that may evolve in the future.
* The CDS has to be viewed as the �Head� of the Indian Armed
Forces in terms of providing strategic control, strategic direction and
strategic vision, even though each Service Chief continues to head his
respective service as hither to fore.
* CDS should have the primary role in formulation of defence
policies.
Rank of the Chief of Defence Staff: After taking a bold and
innovatory step of reviewing the national security structures, the present
Govt. like its predecessors has shied away from giving a proper rank to
the CDS commensurate with the roles. It seems that the Group of Ministers
have been subjected once again to civilian bureaucratic pressure. There is
no justifiable reason why the CDS should not be of five-star rank. It
behoves the world�s third largest armed forces to have a five-star
officer as the �Head�. Also as pointed out earlier, the Indian work
culture does not admit the Western principle of �first amongst equals�.
Selection of Chief of Defence Staff: Principles outlined below, if
followed in the selection of CDS, could help in the evolution of an
effective CDS system in India:
* Present structure, size of each service, predominant land-based
threats and internal security threats dictate that the CDS for some time
should be from the Indian Army.
* The CDS should be the "brightest spark" in the Indian
Armed Forces hierarchy. Hence seniority should not be the criteria for
selection. Qualities of comprehensive intellectual brilliance,
imaginative strategic vision and innovation should be the determining
criteria in selection. Audacity in vision would be an important
criterion.
* Selection of the CDS should be from two panels of three names each.
One panel should be made by a Group of Ministers and the other panel
should be called for from the incumbent CDS.
* The civil bureaucracy should not be associated with the selection
of the CDS.
Chief of Defence Staff System: Organisation Set-up and Links: Evolution,
with experience of obstacles and impediments initially faced, can only
come up with right answers to the organisational set-up and links for the
CDS system. Presently, one can only dwell on some important principles
that should be borne in mind in the initial stages, namely:
* CDS should not emerge as another super military bureaucrat. CDS
should be left free to visualise and plan for the future.
* CDS is envisaged as the single-point Principal Strategic Adviser to
the Prime Minister through the Defence Minister. His organisational
set-up and links are therefore clear.
* By no stretch of imagination can the Defence Secretary be
re-designated as "Principal Security Adviser." Some other
designation has to be found for him in the Integrated Defence Ministry
envisaged.
* The CDS should not be subservient to the National Security Council.
His role should be advisory and of providing another view on strategic
matters.
* The CDS should have a compact tri-service Secretariat, independent
of the Defence Ministry, and capable of perspective planning roles.
Concluding Comments: The decision to appoint a CDS, despite
bureaucratic opposition is a bold and innovative step taken by the present
Government. In the same spirit, the Government should not allow the
creation of the CDS appointment to be mired in controversy either by
opposition from civilian sources or from within the Services. Initial
organisation set-ups and links should be termed and viewed as experimental
and to be reviewed every three years, until the near ideal system relevant
to the Indian strategic environment emerges.
The Indian Armed Forces and the historic creation of the CDS
appointment should never be allowed to be politicised. India owes a
national debt of honour to its Armed Forces for their contributions in
nation building of a newly emergent India. They did not go the way of the
other armies in becoming political - by choice and not by compulsion. The
Indian Armed Forces have proved to be most crucial pillar of the State.
India could borrow some thoughts from Australia as to how Armed Forces
should be viewed. The Australian White Paper on Defence, 2000, states
"The Armed Forces are not simply a service provided by the Government
. They are part of Australia�s national identity." The Indian Armed
Forces too have proved in ample measure in the last 53 years that they are
part of India�s identity, and more than simply a service.
(Dr. Subhash Kapila is an International Relations and
Strategic Affairs analyst. He can be reached on e-mail for discussion at [email protected])
Notes:
1. See The Times of India, May 18,
2001, Government Business Supplement Page I (box)
2. Ibid. Page I "A Milestone in
Decision Making" by K. Subrahmanyam.
3. Ibid. Also see �Public Eye�, K.
Subrahmanyam "Who Says India does not need a Defence Chief" Page
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