South Asia Analysis Group 


Paper no.252

04. 06. 2001

  

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NEPAL, WHAT NEXT?

by B.Raman

Despite the claims of Prince Regent Gyanendra and Prime Minister G.P Koirala that King Birendra of Nepal, the Queen and four other members of the family died due to an "accidental discharge of an automatic weapon", it is widely believed in official circles in Kathmandu that they were killed by Crown Prince Dipendra, since proclaimed King, in a fit of anger in a state of inebriation following a family quarrel after dinner on June 1.

The only eye-witnesses were reportedly Mr.Dhirendra, the youngest brother of the late King, who lost his royal title after marrying a foreigner, Princess Sruti's husband Gorakh and two of the ADCs of the late King.  The identities of the ADCs have not been revealed; nor have they been questioned by the Police to ascertain the exact circumstances of the massacre.

It is also not clear whether Dipendra sustained his brain injury while trying to commit suicide after killing his parents and others or whether he was shot at by the ADCs. He is reported to be brain dead and in an irreversible coma and is unlikely to be ever able to function as a King.

Thus, Prince Regent Gyanendra is for all practical purposes the de facto King and will become de jure after the death of Dipendra He is a well-known environmentalist of Nepal and Chairman of the King Mahendra Trust for Nature Conservation.

Though there were rumours in the past of his having secret links with the Maoists and of his wanting/trying to use them to weaken the traditional/mainstream political parties and thereby further strengthen the position of the royalty, these rumours were unsubstantiated.  These were also unlikely because the royalty and the mainstream political parties are both the main targets of the Maoists.  Moreover, last year, the Maoists had attacked a number of industrial and business enterprises, including a tobacco factory owned by Gyanendra, in order to drive foreign multinationals out of Nepal.

The fact that the Ranas, who revolted against King Tribhuvan in 1950-51, had appointed the then three-year-old Gyanendra as the King, had also put a question mark over his head in the past, but he had remained loyal to King Birendra and maintained a low political profile, confining himself to environment protection related activities.

There is considerable concern in political and non-political circles in Kathmandu over the possibility of the Maoists taking advantage of the resulting uncertainty in the country, which is likely to continue until Gyanendra establishes himself firmly with a satisfactory working relationship with the Government and the political class.  Another source of concern would be the role of the 35,000-strong Army? Would it transfer to the new King its unquestioned loyalty of the past to the late King Birendra? What would be its attitude to the new royal family in general and the Government in particular if it apprehended a triumph of the Maoists? Would it be tempted to take over the administration of the country with or without the approval of the new King under the pretext of preventing a Maoist take-over?

It was in February 1996, that the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) and the United People's Front (UPF) started their "people's war" for the establishment of a Mao style dictatorship of the proletariat in Nepal following a meeting on July 1, 1995 between the Indian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) (People's War Group) and the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) after which they issued the following joint statement: "The Parliamentary system of the reactionaries is facing a crisis everywhere, but the revisionists still are shamelessly trying to take the people along that path.  It has, therefore, become essential to eliminate the counter-revolutionary confusion of the parliamentary system and lead the people toward people's war.  The Marxist-Leninist-Maoist revolutionaries of all countries thus bear the historic responsibility of unitedly providing leadership to the imminent world revolution so as to direct it along the path shown by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao by thwarting revisionist conspiracies."

The "people's war", initially started in six districts, has since spread to more than 50 out of a total of 75 and has recently shown signs of having extended its bases to the neighbourhood of Kathmandu and even Kathmandu, causing concern amongst Western countries, which have a large number of their tourists visiting Nepal, and local and foreign businessmen.  The chief commander of the Maoist insurgents is Comrade Prachanda, whose real name is Pushpa Kamal Dahal and its chief ideologue Baburam Bhattarai.

The Chinese authorities have taken care to avoid any suspicion of a link with the Maoists and during his visit to Kathmandu last month, Prime Minister Zhu Rongji of China was reported to have reassured the Nepalese leaders that Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party had nothing to do with the Maoists, who, according to Beijing, seemed to be operating independently.  There is so far no reason to doubt the Chinese assertion, but if the Maoists ultimately triumph in capturing power in Kathmandu, the immediate beneficiaries would be China and Pakistan.

There are indicators of assistance to the Maoists from the intelligence services of North Korea and Pakistan, who could be acting in tandem or separately, and from the Maoist Shining Path guerillas of Peru.  Since 1996, there have periodically been reports of the presence of Peruvian Maoist ideologues and guerilla warfare experts with the Maoist groups operating in Nepal.

The Nepal Police, which till now has been mainly responsible for counter-insurgency operations against the Maoists, has had very little professional training in such operations and has a very weak intelligence collection capability.  The five-year-old "people's war" has already cost over 1,500 fatal casualties, the majority of them being Maoists, many of them allegedly killed in false encounters by the police.  The police casualties have also been high (over 200).

The Nepalese counter-insurgency experts allege that the Maoists have also been receiving arms and ammunition and explosives from the People's War Group of India. The ineffective performance of the Police against the Maoists could be attributed to the following:

* The lack of will of the political leadership due to a fear of a popular backlash if too strong an action was taken against the guerillas.  In the last general elections in 1999, the various leftist parties of the country--there are eight of them-- received 37.7 per cent of the popular vote, an increase of 5.82 per cent over the 1994 general elections.  The political leadership is afraid that many of these leftist sympathisers might gravitate towards the Maoists.

* Lack of professional training and modern weapons.  For political reasons, the Government is reluctant to seek Indian assistance.  The Maoists allege that Kathmandu has been in receipt of training assistance from the US and the UK. Even if true, this has not made substantial difference.

* The reluctance of the army to get involved in counter-insurgency lest the army's involvement result in its politicisation.  Moreover, while the elected Prime Minister is responsible for all police deployment over which the King has no control, the King has the ultimate authority for Army deployment over which the Prime Minister has little control.  The Army's reluctance is also attributed to the fact that an unestimated number of ex Gurkha servicemen of the Indian and British armies have joined the ranks of the Maoists and the Army is, therefore, afraid of its soldiers getting infected if it participated in counter-insurgency against the Maoists.

Moreover, the political leadership itself, while periodically making statements about the deployment of the Army and indirectly blaming the late King for the difficulties faced by it in doing so, seems to be wary of calling in the Army in a big way lest it antagonise the leftist sympathisers in the general populace.  It has avoided calling a meeting of the National Defence Council (NDC), consisting of the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister and the Army chief, which only can recommend to the King the use of the Army for counter-insurgency.

Individual political leaders (but not the Prime Minister) and Police officers have periodically been critical of the Army for not supplying to the Police modern arms and ammunition and for not going to the assistance of police stations besieged by the Maoists on the ground that the Army could not intervene without the orders of the King.

On the other hand, the Chief of the Army Staff, General Prajjwal Sumsher JB Rana, has been insinuating that the political leadership has not been serious in wanting to deal with the Maoists effectively as, otherwise, the Prime Minister would have convened a meeting of the NDC.  He said in April last year that the NDC should have been activated as national security had been threatened by the Maoist insurgency, but the political leadership had not done so.  "It is immaterial who is in the government; the crucial point is, the NDC should be activated for the sake of greater national interest," he said.

He termed the Maoist movement a serious issue for national security.  "In such a serious moment, it is important that the role and responsibility of an apolitical institution like the Army is expanded," he added, hinting thereby that it was the political leadership and not the Army which was against giving the Army a greater role.

This contentious debate regarding the role of the Army in dealing with the Maoists, involving the palace, the political leadership and the Army, had not been satisfactorily resolved during the days of the late King and could assume worrisome proportions under the new King.

The ever-inherent tensions in the Nepalese State, Government and civil society and amongst the three institutions of the State viz, the King, the political executive and the Army, could get exacerbated in the months to come if the different dramatis personae do not conduct themselves with balance and this could provide external forces inimical to India an opportunity to fish in troubled waters.  If the internal situation deteriorates in the coming months either due to an aggravation of these tensions or due to an uncontrollable increase in Maoist activities, India would be the main sufferer. 

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: [email protected] )

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