HURRIYAT DELEGATION TO VISIT PAKISTAN?
by B.Raman
According to well-informed observers in Islamabad,
Gen.Pervez Musharraf, the self-styled Chief Executive of Pakistan, gives
the impression of being confident of being able to overcome any opposition
to his forthcoming visit to New Delhi for talks with the Indian Prime
Minister, Mr.A.B.Vajpayee.
While the mainstream political parties constituting the
Alliance For the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) have been expressing
misgivings over the right of a non-representative regime to discuss with
India questions likely to have an impact on the sovereignty and
territorial limits of Pakistan (that is, the long-standing demand for the
merger of Jammu & Kashmir with Pakistan) and have raised this during
the hearings on their petition before the Supreme Court challenging the
denial of permission by the military regime to the ARD to hold rallies in
Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, the General does not seem to be unduly
concerned over them.
The mainstream Islamic parties such as the
Jamaat-e-Islami of Qazi Hussain Ahmed and Jammat-ul-Ulema Pakistan of
Maulana Fazlur Rahman have also avoided any active opposition to the
summit though they continue to have misgivings over the reported
behind-the-scene role of the US, particularly its Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).
They are troubled by memories of the pressure exercised
by Mr.Bill Clinton, former US President, on Mr.Nawaz Sharif in July 1999,
as a result of which, according to them, the Pakistani Army and the
jehadis had to surrender the gains made by them in Kargil.
They apprehend that similar pressure by the US on the
General by taking advantage of the critical economic situation in Pakistan
might deprive the jehadis of their gains, operational assets and
advantages in J & K.
The Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen
(HUM), allied to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda in the International Islamic
Front For Jehad Against the US and Israel, the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) and
the Al Badr continue to be bitterly opposed to the summit. They were
shocked by the criticism of the activities of extremist organisations by
the General in his address to the Ulema on June 5.
It is said that while there was no dissenting voice at
the Corps Commanders' Conference on June 8 and 9, many of the participants
felt that since the acceptance of India's invitation by Gen.Musharraf was
a political and not a military decision, it was for the Cabinet and not
the Corps Commanders to approve it.
Thus, while not opposing the decision, they have
maintained a discreet distance from it so that should the summit boomerang
on the General after his visit to New Delhi, just as Mr.Sharif's
Washington visit boomeranged on him, the blame would accrue to the General
in his individual capacity and not to the Army as an institution.
In the unfolding of the pre-summit scenario, there are
at least two foot-draggers---Mr. Abdul Sattar, the Foreign Minister, and
Lt.Gen.Mohammed Aziz, former Chief of the General Staff (CGS) and
presently a Corps Commander in Lahore.
Ever since Gen.Musharraf assumed power, Foreign Service
officers have been unhappy over the way he has inducted serving and
retired military officers into the Foreign Office to monitor its
working. This unhappiness was aggravated by his posting a Brigadier
as in charge of the desk dealing with South-East and East Asia and his
proposed move to post another Brigadier to be in charge of Iran and other
Gulf countries.
There has been further unhappiness over the Foreign
Office being kept ignorant of the alleged back-channel discussions which
preceded the Indian invitation to the General and of the recent visit of
Mr. George Tenet, CIA Director, to Islamabad.
While Gen.Musharraf has no reasons to be unduly worried
over Mr.Sattar's sulking, the co-operation of Lt.Gen.Aziz, who belongs to
the Sudan tribe of the POK, is crucial.
Till 1998-end, Lt.Gen.Aziz, in his then capacity as the
Deputy Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was
responsible for operations in India, including J & K, and Afghanistan,
and, in that capacity, was the controlling officer of the jehadi
organisations, bin Laden and the Taliban. It was he who had drawn up
the Kargil plan and had supervised its implementation.
The jehadi organisations hold him in great respect and
are amenable to his guidance and pressure.
In the famous transcript of the telephone conversation
of Gen.Musharraf, then on a visit to Beijing, and Lt.Gen.Aziz, then CGS,
at the height of the Kargil conflict in June 1999, Lt.Gen.Aziz had told
Gen.Musharraf: " The scruff of their (the jehadis') neck is in our
hands and they will do what we want them to do."
The scruff of their neck is still in the hands of
Lt.Gen.Aziz, who had raised, motivated, trained and infiltrated them into
J & K, and not in those of either Lt.Gen.Mohammed Yousef Khan, the
present CGS, who is a Sindhi, or Lt.Gen.Mahmood Ahmed, the present DG of
the ISI.
It is believed that Lt.Gen.Aziz is the only officer
whose word will be respected by the jehadis. Will he make the
jehadis co-operate with Gen.Musharraf? The present indications are
that, most probably, he will, but one has to keep one's fingers crossed.
Pakistan's reported advice to the Hurriyat to suspend
street agitations till the summit is over was prompted by a fear that any
turn for the worse in the ground situation might vitiate the atmosphere.
There is an expectation in Islamabad that in return for
the Hurriyat's "gesture", the Government of India might now
allow the Hurriyat delegation to visit Islamabad. It is said that by
doing so, both India and Pakistan might be spared the embarrassment that
might be caused if the Hurriyat insists on meeting the General in New
Delhi.
This may please be read in continuation of our earlier
papers on the summit.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For
Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: [email protected])
