Nuclear Factor in India-Pakistan Summit Talk
Dr. Rajesh Kumar Mishra
The architecture of South Asian peace is being influenced significantly
by the non- conventional military potential of India, Pakistan and China.
Should the forthcoming Vajpayee-Musharraf meeting address the prevailing
mutual misperceptions and non-transparency in non-conventional
capabilities?
The inclusion of nuclear factor in the agenda for the summit talk may
benefit both the countries in two ways. First, the increasing
confidence-building steps will avert any accidental use or exchange of
nuclear weapons in future. Secondly, the change in Pakistani posture would
draw several perceptional changes from the Indian side too. Together, it
will help in establishing long term peace in the region.
Ever since the official declaration of the nuclear tests in 1998 by
India and Pakistan, the advocates of non-proliferation view both India and
Pakistan as potential nuclear aggressors. The issues of concern
revolve around some important aspects related to nuclear safety and
war. In other words, the debate is focussed mainly on the risks of
possible use of nuclear weapons or any war. Mutual suspicion over
lack of clarity on the types of use of delivery systems for conventional
and non-conventional purposes and the command and control system of each
country draws global and bilateral concern. This opportunity of talk
that has been initiated by the Indian Prime minister could be utilised by
both India and Pakistan to address international concerns.
In the year 1988, Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto concluded an
agreement to "refrain from undertaking, encouraging or participating
indirectly or directly in any action aimed at causing the destruction or
damage to any such (nuclear) installations or facilities in the other
country". Again, in late January 1991, Indian Prime Minister
Chandrasekhar and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif exchanged
instruments to ratify Indo-Pakistan agreement on not to attack each other�s
nuclear facilities. Further, Lahore declaration, signed
at Lahore on the 21st day of February 1999, mentions- "the respective
governments shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental
or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines
with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear
and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict".
Since then, there has been no improvement in this regard.
Such bilateral commitments, today, are even more important when the two
neighbouring countries are only eight minutes apart for any nuclear
holocaust. Ever since the days of "Islamic bomb" and
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto exhorted that " we will eat grass or leaves, even
go hungry. But we will get one of our own", Pakistan has not
affirmed or indicated the intention of " no first use" (NFU)
policy for its nuclear doctrine. If the past is any indicator when
Pakistan initiated three wars (four if Kargil is included) India would
always expect the worst.
International strategic experts have ever been vigilant keeping track
of the nuclear and missile defence programmes in the region. The
inventories have also been estimated periodically basing on different
sources like those of FAS, IISS ,SIPRI, Acronym Institute, Carnegie
Endowment, Heritage Foundation, Montery Institute , Brookings Institutions
and others. The ambiguities in Pakistan�s nuclear and missile
development programmes have profoundly influenced the analysts. The
real nature of mutually assured destructibility of Pakistan is yet to be
clearly identified
The existence of nuclear weapons in the region cannot be denied for the
near future. But the nuclear posture of Pakistan is not so
predictable as of the Indian side. The matter gets complex when
analysts club the Indian defence programme with Pakistani nuclear weapons
related development and acquisitions. Often, these analyses are
drawn upon variables dissimilar to individual aspirations of the
respective countries. Pakistan�s aspirations and consequent WMD
development are more than its strategic needs. This in turn gives
rise to further speculations in the world environment
The speculations for respective offensive defence capabilities contain
significant international ramifications for the two countries especially
when the "new framework" is in talk amongst the international
community. This new framework, as proposed by Bush, seeks several
changes in conceptual strategic thinking worldwide. South Asia can
not be an exception to those changes as well. At this phase of
transition, any prevailing disbelief or misconception regarding the issues
of nuclear postures in the region may complicate the situation
further. Of late, to an extent India has got some success in
conveying its intention related to its nuclear doctrine. As far as
transparency of the non-conventional military capabilities are concerned,
the task ahead for India also includes seeking reciprocity from Pakistan.
While, the latest invitation of Vajpayee to Pervez Musharraf for
bilateral talks drew criticism and appreciation both in respective
domestic domains, Musharraf�s admission to this peace proposal manifests
his own compulsions too. Particularly, this time, if he fails to
deliver anything good to his country, he may be blamed for another
misadventure like that of Kargil episode.
The man who masterminded the Kargil episode can definitely be not an
apostle for peace in Kashmir overnight. But there are several other
issues on what both India and Pakistan can play positive confidence
building roles. Simultaneously being head of the state and military
both, Musharraf cannot ignore this opportunity of including as many
bilateral issues that concern the future of that country.
Economy must be high in the agenda. Pakistani economy now does
not allow Musharraf to play the tricks that secretly operated during
previous military regimes. Outside help for building on nuclear
defence in the past was carried unmindful of the economic drain. The
time has changed with several amendments in cold-war-theologies too.
The world community today, especially the developed world, that is
advocating for democratic principles of governance and globalisation of
economy will not accept any more misdirected moves of Pakistan.
In the past Pakistan�s military capabilities have been upgraded in
many respects despite growing impoverishment of the country
internally. But, by the poor economic performance in that country
for almost a decade coupled with blatant attacks on the democratic
institutions, Islamabad now needs international support to re-establish
its credentials.
Pakistan today is facing its biggest challenge in continuing its
competition in sustaining nuclear and missile programmes with India than
it was a decade ago. Earlier its ambition of acquiring nuclear and missile
capability was supported mainly by China. This relationship of
Pakistan with China on nuclear and missile cooperation was rooted in the
historically evolved nexus against India. For long, China and
Pakistan together have followed a common and fundamental regional goal to
destabilise Indian security and tranquility. In the guise of
maintaining bilateral friendly relationship, China-Pakistan nexus
threatens Indian national interests.
This troubling nexus has taken years to signal the policy pundits to
call South Asian region, as of "destabilizing competition" or nuclear "volatile
region". The Americans have called this region as "nuclear
flash point". But, seldom have they tried to candidly explain
the causal pattern of the so-called prevailing volatility in this region.
The world community is busy today in discussing the prospective
American missile defence programmes. But, little has been done to
pay attention to the Indian threat perceptions in the South Asian
region. The US needs to have a comprehensive look into the
destabilising factors and the security threats in this region besides the
constraints of cold war legacy in improving Indo-US relations.
From the Indian perspective, India has been sweating over communicating
its nuclear philosophy to the world bodies. The prime opposition and
the related sanctions came from US ever since the Pokhran test.
US-India relation has seen several ups and downs in the past, of late,
both are trying to downplay the prevailing differences. The US�s
Secretary of Defence , Colin Powell has been showing keen interest into
the South Asian affairs. Even, during her confirmation hearing
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Assistant Secretary of
State for South Asia, Christina Rocca mentioned willingness to lift the
post-nuclear sanctions against India.
The Indian unilateral call for bilateral talks may not prove quite
satisfactory and up to the Indian expectations but entails numerous
prospective future exchanges. Such moves for peace and confidence
building measures definitely reflect upon the Indian willingness for long
lasting peace in the South Asian region. Also, this should
accordingly be taken by both Pakistan and the critics of the Indian
defence building programme to help stop negative security speculations.
