PAKISTAN�S ONE POINT AGENDA FOR AGRA SUMMIT 2001
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
Climbing summits is an arduous process calling for great endurance and
determination to scale the top. The world�s mightiest summits
admit only one or two routes to reach the top with no other alternatives
possible. Summits and scaling summits also do not lend themselves to
conditionalities. The end aim has an overriding importance.
The Agra Summit 2001, if it is intended to be scaling of the Summit,
should have the end aim of generating and bringing peace to South
Asia. While India and the United States (the prime mover of bringing
India and Pakistan to the negotiating table) seem to share this aim,
Pakistan and its President Musharraf, seem to have only one perspective
i.e. Kashmir.
United States Strategic Interests and Expectation: The United
States seems to have re-cast its South Asian policies to accommodate a
greater recognition of India�s strategic and power potential and
exploring the forging of a strategic co-optive relationship for the
future. Pakistan, however, still continues to hover as an important
determinant in US South Asian policies.
United States' current strategic interests and concerns regarding
Pakistan can be analysed as: (1)Pakistan does not end up as a failed
state; (2)Pakistan does not fall prey to Talibanisation; (3)Pakistan does
not initiate a nuclear armed conflict in the face of Indian conventional
military superiority. The United states also regards Pakistan as an
important strategic ally to further US interests in Central Asia.
Since Pakistan has exhibited all indicators of a �failing state�
and becoming increasingly Talibanised, United States including the present
Bush Administration, redoubled its efforts to bail out Pakistan, by
pressurising India to accept negotiations with Musharraf, in reversal of
its earlier declared policies.
The United States assesses that it is Musharraf only who can arrest
Pakistan�s slippage into a failed state and Talibanisation. Having
achieved the first part of its aim to bring PM Vajpayee talking to
President Musharraf, United States hopes and expects that: (1) India and
Pakistan seem to be in a participative dialogue at the Summit level; (2)
Logically expect that some nuclear confidence building measures emerge
from the Summit; (3) discuss the Kashmir issue; and (4) lower the overall
confrontation temperature in South Asia.
India�s Hopes for the Summit: India�s hopes for the Agra Summit
rest on the end-aim of achieving a durable peace in South Asia.
India views conflict resolution in South Asia in a very comprehensive
manner and hence a composite dialogue on all outstanding issues including
end of Pakistan�s proxy war and state-sponsored terrorism in J&K
State. India also hopes that Pakistan would be more forthcoming in
discussing nuclear confidence-building measures at the Agra Summit.
India�s reversal from its earlier declarative policy of dialogue with
Pakistan may be attributed to : (1) India�s desire to be accommodative
to United States strategic interests in pursuance of the aim of forging a
sound Indo-US strategic relationship; and (2) India not to be viewed as
obstructive in conflict-resolution initiatives.
India�s agreement for the Agra Summit should not be viewed by USA or
Pakistan as a sign of weakness. India approaches the Agra Summit
from a position of strong relative strength, but with sincere hopes for a
composite dialogue to bring peace in South Asia.
Pakistan�s One-Point Agenda for Agra Summit: President Musharraf�s
statements (in the 2 July, 2001 interview to The Times of India) just two
weeks before the Agra Summit, makes disappointing reading. An
analysis of his statements brings forth the following major conclusions
regarding his approach and attitudes at the Agra Summit: (1) Kashmir is
the single point agenda for Pakistan; (2) Kashmir discussions would not be
allowed unnecessary dilution by discussion of other peripheral issues; (3)
Other issues will be talked only when progress is made on the Kashmir
issue; and(4) Progress in economic and cultural fields can only follow the
resolution of the Kashmir issue.
On the issues of concerns to the United States and India , namely,
Islamic Jehad and nuclear confidence-building measures, President
Musharraf was disappointing. He was not forthcoming on nuclear
restraint. President Musharraf also refused to commit himself to any
restraint policy in terms of Islamic Jehadi activity in J&K State,
even in case some structured dialogue on Kashmir gets underway.
Summit Outcome Bleak: While Musharraf's spin-doctors have been very
active, the Indian media in the run-up to the Agra Summit has also gone
wild in its hyped-up coverage and analysis. It has generated exaggerated
expectations of the Agra Summit. It has focussed its coverage on Pakistan
only, without any significant coverage of India�s official set-up, both
political and the Ministry of External Affairs. This leads to
distortion of the overall perspective.
Pakistan�s perspective, attitudes and approaches to the Agra Summit
are at marked variance to US strategic interests and concerns and India�s
hopes for a comprehensive peace in South Asia, based on a composite
dialogue.
While pomp and grandeur and photo-op opportunities at the Agra Summit
would abound in plenty, the prospects of any substantial and meaningful
outcome are bleak.
Conclusion: In the absence of any substantial outcome at the Agra
Summit, the losers will not be India and Pakistan. The biggest loser
will be the United States which has prompted and scripted the Agra
Summit. Its credibility will suffer in the general Indian perception
in that the United States once again failed to pressurise Pakistan to walk
the road to peace in South Asia in a comprehensive and composite
manner. USA will be left with no space to jump-start any ensuing
stalemates. United States should therefore prevail on Musharraf to
abandon his single-point agenda.
India is resilient and strong to withstand any further bleeding in
J&K State that Pakistan would be tempted to impose in the post-Agra
Summit phase as a result of lack of progress on the Kashmir issue.
Continuation of Kashmir issue as a single-point of confrontation with
India will hurt Pakistan more in the long run.
President Musharraf when questioned on the Kargil issue during the
interview was dismissive that history should not be reopened as it would
open a Pandora�s box. But it is history that President Musharraf
should pay heed to. The history of Indo-Pak conflicts of the last 53
years painfully illustrates that the road to peace in South Asia, does not
travel via Srinagar, nor does Srinagar lie atop the Summit.
(Dr. Subhash Kapila is an International Relations and
Strategic Affairs analyst. He can be reached on e-mail for
discussion at [email protected])
