ATTACK ON SRI LANKAN AIRBASE AT KATUNAYAKE
by B.Raman
"Apart from hit and run raids on
the ground and in the sea and suicide attacks on individual targets, the
LTTE has not been able to mount any major offensive against the Armed
Forces, partly due to manpower shortage and partly due to depletion of its
anti-aircraft ammunition and missiles. The reported tightening of security
measures by countries such as Thailand, Greece etc to prevent LTTE
gun-running and the closer surveillance of ships owned by the LTTE by
Western narcotics control agencies because of the suspicion of their
involvement in narcotics smuggling at the instance of Pakistani heroin
smugglers have created difficulties for the LTTE in replenishing its
stocks. Unable to face the air strikes from the Sri Lankan Air Force, the
only alternative for the LTTE to neutralise the former's new capability is
to destroy the aircraft on the ground through hit and run raids on the Air
Force bases. While the LTTE has repeatedly demonstrated a capability for
such raids on Sri Lankan Naval establishments, it has not been able to
organise such raids on the Air Force bases, presumably because of tighter
ground security in the Air Force."
" Despite the stalling
of the LTTE's offensive against the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and the
difficulties faced by it at the international level, it would be unwise to
underestimate the continued determination of Prabakaran and the motivation
of his cadres to achieve the LTTE's strategic objective. The LTTE has been
thwarted by the Armed Forces for the time being, but not vanquished."
--- Extracts from the writer's
paper of December 11,2000, titled "Sri Lanka: Realities &
Options" (www.saag.org/papers2/paper168.htm
)
At 11 AM on July 24, a web site
believed to be close to the LTTE put out the following item : "Sri
Lanka�s only international airport, Katunayake ,was closed by the
military early morning Tuesday after air force planes at an adjoining
airbase came under attack from suspected members of the Liberation Tigers,
officials said. A number of aircraft were on fire, they said. Fuel dumps
in the base were also ablaze, they added. A number of the Sri Lanka Air
Force�s Israeli made Kfir and Mig-27 jet bombers are stationed at the
airbase. Military sources said six aircraft were ablaze, but could not
confirm the types. Fighting was ongoing."
Independent reports indicated as follows:
* The attack was on Sri Lanka's only international
airport and a nearby Air Force base. Thirteen persons were killed, nine
of them from the LTTE, according to the Sri Lankan authorities.
* The pre-dawn attack starting at 3-30 AM local time
coincided with the anniversary of the 1983 anti-Tamil riots in Colombo.
* The attack near the capital of Colombo damaged or
destroyed five Sri Lankan Airlines Airbus planes and eight military
planes.
In the second half of 1994, the LTTE had helped the
Harkat-ul-Ansar (since renamed as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen), the terrorist
organisation of Pakistan run by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in
smuggling at least two shiploads of arms and ammunition from Karachi for
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) of the Southern Philippines. In
return for the LTTE's assistance in safely carrying these items to the
Southern Philippines, the HUM and the ISI gave to it an undetermined
quantity of anti-aircraft guns with ammunition and surface-to-air
shoulder-fired missiles.
The LTTE brought these weapons into use for the first
time in April 1995 when it downed two aircraft of the Sri Lankan Air Force
(SLAF) at Palali. Subsequently, it continued to use its anti-aircraft
capability acquired from the HUM and the ISI against the SLAF effectively
.
It was also reported to have received replenishments of
this capability in return for assisting the HUM in shipping to a port in
Turkey consignments of arms and ammunition meant for the Islamic
terrorists in Chechnya.
After the LTTE's spectacular capture of the Elephant
Pass in 1999, the Sri Lankan Government had received the following
equipment from abroad:
* Three new multiple-barrel rocket launchers (MBRLs) from
Pakistan and five more from the Czech Republic.
* Field artillery from China.
* An undetermined number of Dvora fast-attack craft (FACs)
fitted with the latest target acquisition equipment for the Navy and six
more Kfir aircraft from Israel, bringing the total number of this kind
of aircraft at the disposal of the SLAF to 11.
* Helmets, uniforms, body armour and two Hercules
C-130 transport aircraft from the UK
Since the middle of 2000, the LTTE has been facing
problems in its operations against the Sri Lankan Armed Forces due to the
effective use of the SLAF with the help of Israeli advisers against the
LTTE's ground concentrations and the difficulties faced by the LTTE in
replenishing its stocks of anti-aircraft ammunition and missiles. Its
attempt to procure these items from Ukraine with the help of Chechen arms
smugglers did not reportedly succeed.
The LTTE was able to bring down two helicopters of the
SLAF last year, but these were most probably brought down by machine gun
fire, but it didn't demonstrate any capability against high and
fast-flying aircraft. There were indications that it was, therefore,
planning to attack the SLAF bases and destroy the aircraft on the
ground--- through techniques such as penetration of the air base by
suicide bombers moving on the ground as well as penetration over the
perimeter fence through microlite aircraft. Since the beginning of the
1990s, LTTE cadres based in West Europe and Canada had been undergoing
training in the use of microlite aircraft for such operations. It is not
known whether microlite planes were used in the attack on the Katunayake
base on July 24 morning.
The SLAF was estimated to have had a total of about 40
combat aircraft in flying condition. Even after the loss of eight of them
in Tuesday's attack, it should be able to carry out air strikes against
ground positions of the LTTE in the North, but at a reduced scale.
Moreover, the impact on the morale of the SLAF is bound to be negative.
Taking advantage of the LTTE's depleted anti-aircraft
capability, the SLAF had stepped up its air strikes since April this year.
The attack on the Katunayake air base on July 24 is the LTTE's riposte ,
demonstrating thereby that the morale, daring and innovativeness of its
cadres remain unimpaired and that the over-confidence displayed by
President Chandrika Kumaratunga and the Armed Forces in recent months was
unwarranted.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For
Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: [email protected]
)
