UNITED STATES AND THE AGRA SUMMIT
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
The United States, despite its public disclaimers played an active and
key facilitatory role in the holding of the Agra Summit in mid July 2001
between Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistan�s military dictator,
General Musharraf (the latter declared himself President for the Agra
Summit). Prior to the Agra Summit, General Musharraf, publicly claimed
that India was forced into a dialogue with Pakistan under pressure from
United States . The Pakistani General was not far wrong.
Pointers on the Indian side seemed to substantiate the Pakistani
General�s assertion. The sudden reversal of India�s declaratory policy
in not entering into a dialogue with Pakistan until cessation of proxy war
in J&K and cross-border terrorism was a strong pointer. The timing of
Indian Prime Minister�s dialogue offer to Pakistan re-confirmed this
suspicion. The Indian Army was re-gaining the upper hand over the Islamic
Jehadis, despite the six months of unilateral cease fire imposed by the
Indian Prime Minister. There were no domestic compulsions to force India
to reverse its policies towards a dialogue with Pakistan. In fact, it was
the Pakistani General, who was pleading internationally for a dialogue.
India was not under any international pressure to reverse its policies,
at least apparently. Nor was the Indian Prime Minister�s offer for a
dialogue i.e. the Agra Summit an act of individual statesmanship. It
emerges that the Indian Prime Minister and his close advisers came under
United States pressure on various counts to reverse their policy of �no-dialogue
with Musharraf�.
US Pressures For Agra Summit - The Indicators: The first major
indicator that the United States was actively getting involved now on the
Kashmir issue was the initiation of a conference which was hosted around
April 20, 2001 by the US Department of States, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research with support from the Policy Planning Bureau. It was moderated by
Walter Anderson, Head of South Asia Division of the Bureau along with
Steve Ghitelman. The conference was not open to the media. The list of
participants included Howard Schaffer (former US Ambassador to Bangladesh
and now with Georgetown University), Teresita Schaffer (former US
Ambassador to Sri Lanka and now head of South Asia Program, Center for
International and Strategic Studies, Washington), Robert Wirsing (has
written extensively on South Asia and on the Siachen issue particularly.
Presently with Asia-Pacific Center), Sumit Ganguly (University of Texas, Austin).
Suspect from the Indian point of view, were Paula Newberg (UN Foundation),
Farooq Kathwari (CEO of Ethan Allen and sponsor of Kashmir Study Group)
and Zafar Iqbal Cheema (Oxford University). While the sponsors claimed
that it was just an exercise to probe if there was any new thinking on
Kashmir, what it does indicate is that the new Bush Administration, under
compulsions unknown was getting active on Kashmir. South Asia was not
boiling and there were other bigger international challenges for the
United States to attend to.
The second indicator centred around the movement of American interlocutors
of Pakistani origin like Mansoor Ijaz and Farooq Kathiwari. Obviously both
of them had the backing and official sanction of United States. Mansoor
Ijaz has claimed in an interview that he was able to persuade the Indian
Govt (read PM Vajpayee) to talk to Kashmiri political leaders (read
Hurriyat), the Kashmiri militants and also to clear channel for PM
Vajpayee and General Musharraf to talk. Both leaders would not have cared
to talk to unknown entities, had it not been for the strong US backing of
these entities.
The third indicator was the sudden emergence of a host of articles in
US foreign policy journals by their noted think-tank professionals,
stressing dialogue on Kashmir and advocating various options.
The fourth indicator which was parallel to the above was a sustained
campaign in India through think tanks, conferences and mouthing of the US
agenda through academia dons and media elite.
The fifth indicator was the flurry of US and Indian Officials to each
others capital in the run-up to the Agra Summit. It was the same pattern
for Pakistan too.
All the tell tale signs above, (though full material on them may
surface later, since the Agra Summit has been a failure) suggest that the
United States has played an active role in bringing about the Agra Summit.
United States Interests in Holding of the Agra Summit - Differing
Assessments: The moot question is as to why did the new Bush
Administration in the United States get so actively involved in the
holding of an India-Pakistan dialogue at the commencement of its term.
There was no imminent threat of war in South Asia which should have
prompted United States to jump-start a process on which both India and
Pakistan have irreconcilable fundamental differences.
The most common assessment revolves around the apprehension that
Kashmir is a nuclear flash-point. This theory stood debunked by the Kargil
War of 1999 where India showed tremendous restraint despite Pakistan�s
attempts at nuclear blackmail. Ample space exists in a limited war
scenario between a conventional war and its escalation into a nuclear
conflict United States needs to recognise this.
A plausible assessment that can be made is that the United States is
chary of Pakistan becoming a Talibanised state and it feels that General
Musharraf is its best bet in arresting the downslide. To that extent the
United States wanted to impart legitimacy to General Musharraf and there
could have been no better way than to pressurise India to sit down and
talk to him. United States therefore accorded proxy legitimacy to General
Musharraf through India.
Another logical assessment is that oil-politics have come to the fore
again, adding renewed strategic significance on Pakistan, in relation to
Central-Asian oil and its pipelines through Afghanistan and Pakistan to
the North Arabian Sea. This again would involve imparting legitimacy to
the Pakistani General, who had actively associated with US intelligence
agencies during the Afghanistan war against the USSR.
Agra Summit Failure - Lessons for the United States: The failure of
the Agra Summit holds important lessons for the United States
notwithstanding whether it was actively involved or not in the holding of
the Agra Summit.
Conflict negotiation and conflict-resolution of the Western variety do
not hold good in the Indo-Pak context. The Indo-Pak differences arising
out of the two -nation theory are both historical and civilisational. To
argue otherwise is a futile exercise in Western style liberalism.
Track II diplomacy has no place in the resolution of Indo-Pak
conflicts. India has institutionalised mechanisms for conduct of its
foreign policy and matters of national security. These cannot be by-passed
like in Pakistan even by a politically popular leader.
United States may realise that in South Asia, India and Pakistan are
two unequal entities politically, militarily and economically. Attempts by
external balancing of the two only discredits the external balancer in the
eyes of one billion Indians. A natural balance has to prevail in South
Asia.
The Indian public opinion cannot be influenced through the media elite,
academia dons or the pseudo-liberals of India�s capital. Nor can it be
influenced by India�s electronic media with their superficial analyses
of sensitive subjects of state. United States has to note that the Indian
masses, despite Western projection of poverty and illiteracy are
politically conscious and sensitive. They do have strong views on India�s
security, Kashmir and Pakistan. No Prime Minister of India can ever
disregard this even under external pressure.
Post-Agra Summit-The Road Ahead for the United States: While
planning its road map forward of the failed Agra summit, United States
needs to bear in mind the experiences of its past diplomacy on the Kashmir
issue. United States history of involvement on this issue has been a
sorry record . It was heavily tilted in favour of Pakistan due to Cold War
strategic compulsions with adverse consequences for the United States in
terms of the public opinion of the Indian masses.
The futility of the above stances were recognised in the recent
past by President Bush Sr and belatedly towards the fag end of his second
tenure by President Clinton. President Bush Sr while laying down his
office strongly maintained that Kashmir was a bi-lateral issue between
India and Pakistan and could best be resolved bi-laterally under the Simla
Agreement. President Clinton in his eighth year of office came to the same
conclusion and went a step further to emphasise that the "Sanctity of
the LOC" must be maintained, when forcing Pakistan to withdraw its
forces from Kargil. This was a reiteration of one of the most important
clauses of the Simla Agreement. Any United States pronouncements of
mediation or third party involvement on the Kashmir issue amount to
violation of the Simla Agreement i.e. bi-lateralism. To that extent the
recent statements of US Secretary of States, General Colin Powell have
been strongly condemned in the Indian media as" not only outrageous
and unwanted but out of context". In the similar vein the statements
of the doyen of American South Asia watchers Prof. Stephen Cohen
have drawn ridicule, when he suggested that it is the time for the United
States to step-in and that there is a requirement of international
verifiers or enforcers.
The sign-posting so far for the United States in terms of the road
ahead of the failed Agra Summit points that (1) United States should
desist from facilitating any more of Agra style of Summits (2) United
States should keep out of any mediatory roles in Indo-Pak
conflicts; it will only singe and single out itself thereby have its image
diluted in India (3) United States must unequivocally make a declaratory
statement on South Asia re-affirming the relevance of Simla Agreement, the
bi-lateral process and the imperatives of respecting the sanctity of LAC
by Pakistan (what Clinton did) (4) Disabuse its strategic
perceptions that Kashmir is a nuclear flash-point.
Conclusion: The history of the involvement of the United States in
the conflict -resolution in South Asia, basically the Indo- Pak conflicts
has been a poor one. It does not inspire confidence in India. It has
failed to produce results because it had been one-sided in favour of
Pakistan.
The Agra Summit, which would not have come about without United States
involvement and pressure reinforces the above contention. It seems that
all American efforts with Pakistan through its diplomats, senior military
officials, head of CIA and Track II diplomats, failed to impress Pakistan
on the basic issues -Simla Agreement, bilateralism and sanctity of LAC
(i.e. cross boarder terrorism), All these stood endorsed by President Bush
Sr and President Clinton.
President Bush Jr needs to impress on his Administration officials the
imperatives of continuance of policies that have already been
endorsed, in principle, by the United States. If for nothing else, the
imperatives of a growing Indo-US strategic partnership moving from
estrangement to engagement of the democracies does not permit disowning of
endorsements of the past.
(Dr. Subhash Kapila is an
International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He can be
reached on e-mail for discussion at [email protected])
