CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS TO PAKISTAN
by B.Raman
Executive Summary :
China considers that it is in its national security
interest to help Pakistan maintain a nuclear weapon and missile delivery
capability against India. For nearly two decades now, it has,
therefore, been clandestinely providing to Pakistan nuclear and missile
material, expertise and technology in violation of international control
regimes, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It is
not a member of the MTCR, but has repeatedly pledged that it adheres to
its provisions. Whenever its clandestine supplies to Pakistan are
detected by US intelligence agencies, it first denies any such shipments,
then claims that any shipments were not in violation of control regimes,
then blames non-Government entities (as if there are non-Government
entities in such sensitive fields in China) for making the shipments
without the Government's knowledge, proposes experts' level talks with the
US to remove misunderstandings, makes another pledge to observe the
control regimes and violates it once again. This has been going on
and on. It has been estimated that since the 1980s, China has made
15 such pledges and subsequently violated each and every one of
them. The same has been the fate of the pledge made by it to the US
on November 21,2000, as the following chronology shows.
Under the economic sanctions imposed against China by
the Bush Sr Administration after the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989,
export of commercial communications satellites to China for being launched
by Chinese rockets is banned. However, the Congress has vested the
President with powers to issue waivers if considered necessary in national
interest.
Former President Bush Sr issued nine such waivers in
three years. This was one of the reasons why Mr.Clinton, during the
presidential campaign of 1992, accused Mr.Bush of mollycoddling
Beijing. Mr.Clinton's attitude changed after coming to office and he
himself issued 11 waivers in five years.
Both the Administrations justified the liberal issue of
waivers as meant to be incentives to Beijing to exercise voluntary
restraint on the export of missiles and related technology to other
countries and to ultimately adhere fully to the MTCR.
The aerospace and telecommunications lobbies justified
their demand for the easing of restrictions on the launching of their
satellites on Chinese rockets by pointing out that it cost only 50 per
cent of what it would cost if they were to get them launched on West
European or Russian rockets.
Some advocates of a more liberal regime also underlined
the opportunities such launchings provided to the scientific experts of
the US intelligence community to visit Chinese space establishments and
launching sites under the cover of the executives of the US companies,
interact with Chinese scientists and identify points of strength and
weaknesses of Chinese rockets and the direction of their R & D thrust.
In 1997, allegations were made in the US media that the
Democratic Party and Mr. Clinton himself had been in receipt of hefty
campaign contributions not only from US aerospace companies, but also from
a PLA-owned aerospace conglomerate of China, which had been the
beneficiaries of the liberal issue of waivers by Mr. Clinton.
Between 1994 and 1996, the Long March rockets of China
went through a bad patch with a failure rate of 25 per cent. Amongst
the US companies affected by these failures were the Hughes Space &
Communications in 1995 and the Loral Space & Communications in 1996.
Hughes' experts, who investigated the 1995 failure,
reportedly identified the causes as inaccurate mathematical formulae used
by the Chinese for assessing the impact of atmospheric conditions on the
launching, structural weaknesses in the rivets used to attach the
satellites to the rockets and the shape of the nose-cone which caused
instability during the launchings. Without the knowledge of the
Clinton Administration, the company allegedly shared these findings with
the Chinese authorities.
Similarly, the Loral Company allegedly shared with the
Chinese, without the permission of the administration, an enquiry report
submitted by a team, which had investigated the failure of the 1996
launch.
The repeated failures between 1994 and 1996 of the Long
March rockets led to a steep increase in the insurance premia for
commercial satellites launched on Chinese rockets. What the Hughes and the
Loral were gaining as a result of the attractive discount rates for
launchings offered by the Chinese was neutralised by the increase in
insurance premium rates and the losses due to the delayed commissioning of
the satellites.
This made the American companies as anxious as the
Chinese to improve the performance of the Long March rockets and it was
alleged that the Hughes and the Loral not only shared their findings on
the failures with the Chinese, but also gave them advice as to how to
remove the defects. It was contended that, as a result, the
performance of the Long March rockets significantly improved .
The Congressional opponents of space co-operation with
China saw a nexus between the campaign contributions by the aerospace
companies, the liberal issue of waivers and the failure of the Clinton
Administration to take punitive action against the Hughes and the Loral
for the breach of security rules and claimed that these two companies, by
their action, had not only helped China in improving the performance of
its Long March rockets, but would have also enabled it to improve the
accuracy of its missiles directed at the US. It was this, which,
inter alia, led to the launching of the Cox Committee to enquire into
China's clandestine acquisition of technology from the US.
The Cox Committee hearings brought out the greater
tolerance of clandestine Chinese acquisition activities by the Clinton
Administration and of the repeated breaches of security rules by US
business companies with expanding interests in China. This was in
marked contrast to the severe action which the pre-1991 US Administrations
used to take against similar clandestine acquisitions by the USSR and
against US companies obliging the Soviets in violation of security rules.
This tolerance could be attributed partly to the
enormous interests of the US business companies in the expanding Chinese
market and partly to ill-advised policy considerations. The US
companies did not have a similar interest in the Soviet market and do not
have a similar interest in the Russian market. The ill-advised
policy considerations arose from na�ve assumptions, which have been
repeatedly belied, that such leniency towards China could bring in
political dividends in the form of a more responsible and responsive
Chinese regime in matters such as restraints in the export of nuclear
weapons and missile technologies to Iran and Pakistan and political
liberalisation to accompany the economic liberalisation.
The present Bush Administration came to office with a
pledge to take strong action against China if it continued to violate its
pledges. During his visit to Beijing in the last week of July, 2001,
Gen (retd).Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, took up with the Chinese
leaders the continuing shipments of Chinese missiles and components to
Pakistan in violation of the November 21,2000, pledge. The Chinese
once again denied any such violation and proposed another round of
experts' talks to go into this. Instead of imposing sanctions
against Beijing at least now, Gen.Powell has agreed to the Chinese
proposal.
The present Administration has thus shown that its
policy on this subject is no different from that of the previous
Administration. It may bark against China, but will not bite lest
its business interests suffer.
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The chronology follows:
After experts' level talks between the US and China on
US complaints of China's continued export of missiles and missile
components to Pakistan, a spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs issued the following statement at Beijing on November 21,2000:
"China is opposed to the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction. As a State Party to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons Convention and
Biological Weapons Convention, China fulfils its obligations under the
above international legal instruments in letter and spirit. China
has no intention to assist, in any way, any country in the development of
ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e.,
missiles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a
distance of at least 300 kilometers).
"China will, based on its own missile
non-proliferation policy and export control practices, further improve and
reinforce its export control system, including by publishing a
comprehensive export control list of missile-related items including dual
use items.
"Logically speaking, this control list will include
equipment, material and technology that can be directly used in missiles,
as well as missile-related dual use items. In establishing its
control list, China will take into account the relevant practices of other
countries in terms of scope and detail with a view to strengthening the
effectiveness of its control system.
"As part and parcel of its efforts in enforcing
missile-related export controls in accordance with this control list, the
Chinese Government will naturally require all Chinese entities and
individuals to obtain a government license for the export of items on this
list. In making export licensing determination for items on the
list, the Chinese Government will take into consideration the proposed
end-use and end-user for the item and the risk that the item will be
diverted to programs for the development of missiles capable of delivering
nuclear weapons.
"In the case of transfers to countries that are
developing ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, China
will exercise special scrutiny and caution, even for items not
specifically contained on the control list, so as to prevent significant
contributions to those countries� development of ballistic missiles
capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
"The Chinese Government will work to publish the
above missile-related export control list and related regulations at an
early date. Pending that, China will continue to enforce its
existing measures so as to ensure that the policy of not assisting, in any
way, countries in the development of missiles that can be used to deliver
nuclear weapons will be implemented.
"China stands ready to continue to cooperate and
hold consultations with the US and other countries on the issue of
non-proliferation with a view to strengthening their respective export
control systems for missile related equipment and technology."
Simultaneously the same day, at Washington, Mr.Richard
Boucher, the spokesman of the US State Department, held a briefing
on the Chinese commitment. He made the following salient points:
"We welcome the People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry
spokesperson's statement of November 21 regarding China's clear policy
commitment not to assist in any way other countries to develop ballistic
missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons and to further
improve and reinforce its export control system, including by publishing
at an early date a comprehensive export control list of missile-related
items, including dual-use items.
"This development can strengthen cooperation between the United
States and China to achieve our common objective of preventing the spread
of ballistic missiles that threaten regional and international
security. In consideration of China's commitment to strengthen its
missile-related export control system, we have decided to waive economic
sanctions required by US law for past assistance by Chinese entities to
missile programs in Pakistan and Iran.
"Given the relationship between missile nonproliferation and peaceful
space cooperation, the United States will now resume the processing of
licenses that are necessary for commercial space cooperation between US
and Chinese companies, such as launching US satellites in China. In
addition, the United States and China will resume discussions as soon as
possible on extending the 1995 US-China agreement regarding international
trade and commercial launch services.
"The US stands ready to continue to cooperate and hold consultations
with China and other countries on the issues of nonproliferation with a
view to strengthening their respective export control systems for
missile-related equipment and technology.
"This has been a subject of ongoing discussion with the Chinese for
quite some time, many years in fact. I know there have been reports
about China's missile-related activities in the past. What we have
done here is to work out an arrangement that commits China not to assist
other countries in the development of Missile Technology Control Regime
Class ballistic missiles in any way, and to put in place comprehensive
missile-related export controls. In exchange, the US side has
decided to waive sanctions under US law for past Chinese assistance to
missile programs in Pakistan and Iran, and to resume certain commercial
space interactions with China. Sanctions have been imposed upon
Pakistani and Iranian recipients of the Chinese assistance.
"The effective implementation of China's new commitments would be
another important step by China to join the international nonproliferation
mainstream, and it would promote international security and further
US-China cooperation.
"China's statement includes broad new commitments of nonproliferation
and security importance, but its value ultimately will depend on whether
those commitments are implemented fully and conscientiously. In that
connection, while the United States is waiving sanctions that would
otherwise be imposed for past transfers to missile programs in Pakistan
and Iran, the waiver does not apply to any transfers that might occur in
the future. We are confident that the next Administration will
follow this question closely.
"These discussions with China have been ongoing for some time.
I think most recently we had a team go to Beijing after the talks with
North Korea in Kuala Lumpur about a month ago. The team went up to
Beijing and held some further discussions. This was certainly a
topic of the Secretary's discussions and the President's discussions in
Brunei, where they confirmed the understandings and emphasized the
importance of full and complete implementation of the understandings that
have been reached.
"We do have an ongoing process that reviews very carefully all the
available information on potentially sanctionable activity. The
missile sanctions law imposes a number of requirements that must be met
with high confidence in order for the legal standard for sanctions
determination to be met. Moreover, because we do take seriously our
responsibility and because of the serious national security, foreign
policy and economic consequences of imposing sanctions, we have always
insisted on a high standard of evidence. These factors contributed
to the amount of time necessary to make these sanctions determinations.
"On the activities itself, some Chinese entities and Pakistani
entities were involved in transfers of Missile Technology Control Regime
Category I items; that is, complete missiles, their major subsystems, or
their production facilities, and of Missile Technology Control Regime
Category II items, components and materials used to make Category I
missiles and subsystems to Pakistani entities that contributed to Missile
Technology Control Regime Class Missile Programs in Pakistan. With regard
to Iran, some Chinese entities and Iranian entities were involved in
transfers of Missile Technology Control Regime Category II items to
Iranian entities that contributed to Missile Technology Control Regime
Class Missile Programs in Iran.
"We determined under US law that a number of Chinese entities
transferred missile-related equipment and technology to entities in Iran
and Pakistan; that those transfers contributed to so-called Category I
missile programs in Iran and Pakistan; and that all of the entities knew
they were involved in Category I missile activities. Therefore, under our
law, sanctions against these Chinese and Iranian and Pakistani entities
are required to be either imposed or waived, as permitted by the sanctions
law. In consideration of China's commitment not to assist the
development of MTCR-class ballistic missiles in any way and to strengthen
its missile-related export controls, we are waiving the sanctions required
against the Chinese entities.
"We are imposing sanctions against the Iranian and Pakistani
entities, and those sanctions will be announced in the Federal Register
shortly. The sanctioned entities in Iran are the Defense Industries
Organization, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, and
their sub-units and successors. The sanctioned entities in Pakistan
are the Ministry of Defense and the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research
Commission, and their sub-units and successors.
"For a two-year period, all new individual export licenses for
Commerce- or State-controlled items and all new US Government contracts
are denied to the Pakistani Ministry of Defense, Space and Upper
Atmosphere Research Commission, and their sub-units and successors.
In addition, for a two-year period, all imports into the US of products
produced by the Pakistani Ministry of Defense and its sub-units and
successors will be denied. Finally, for a two-year period, all new
individual export licenses for Commerce- or State-controlled MTCR Annex
items and all new US Government contracts related to MTCR Annex items are
denied to the Iranian entities, the Defense Industry Organization, the
Ministry of Defense, and their sub-units and successors.
"Because of the ongoing US embargo against Iran and preexisting US
sanctions against Iran and Pakistan, the new sanctions will actually have
very limited economic effect, but they do send a strong signal that the
United States opposes these countries' missiles programs.
"There are Chinese entities that have close government connections,
including being part of ministries and things like that. What happened
was, because the Chinese Government itself committed to impose and publish
a set of controls that were of the same sort as the Missile Technology
Control Regime and agreed to implement these restrictions for the future,
we were able to waive the sanctions that might be applied to Chinese
entities generally.
"Membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime is taken by
consensus of the members; there are currently 32 countries. China's
new commitments, if they are implemented fully, certainly would constitute
major steps towards Chinese membership in the regime in the future.
But, at this point, what is important is getting control of the activities
that might be considered proliferating, and for China to do this we think
is a major step forward.
"I think you have to ask China what their considerations are with
joining or not joining (MTCR). What is important to us is that China
control its missile-related exports, and what we have done here is reached
agreement with the Chinese, through many months of very detailed
discussion on the items and the controls and the publication of rules and
the means of control, to make sure that China will impose a set of
controls that are largely equivalent to the Missile Technology Control
Regime ones.
"If the rules are applied, there won't be any leakage. How
difficult is it to apply the rules? We believe that the Chinese
Government is capable and indeed is committed to applying these new rules
and to implementing thoroughly their decisions not to assist other
countries in developing missile technology -- ballistic missiles of this
class. And that is why, I think as I noted, the Secretary's
discussions with the Chinese Foreign Minister or the Vice Premier, the
President's discussions of this topic with the Chinese President in
Brunei, focused on the issue of implementation and the need to thoroughly
implement the commitments that China is making here.
"I think I put both Iran and Pakistan in the same sentence there;
that because these duplicate other sanctions, the direct economic effect
may not be large, but it certainly makes it very clear our position
against the development of missiles in these places.
"Both China and the United States said that we would remain ready to
continue to cooperate in consultations with each other on these matters,
and therefore on the complete and full implementation of these
restrictions. And obviously that is something that we have done all
along, and now we will be continuing to do it in terms of the rules that
China is putting in place.
"I think I mentioned in the statement that we will resume processing
certain licenses and resume some discussions with the Chinese on missile
launches. Let me go back to more detail. If the sanctions had been
imposed upon the Chinese entities, one consequence would have been to
preclude commercial space interactions, like launches of US satellites on
Chinese rockets. We decided several months ago not to begin
negotiations on a new US-China space launch agreement to replace the 1995
agreement that expires next year, and not to conduct normal processing of
export licenses for commercial space interactions until the sanctions
process has concluded.
"Now that the sanctions process has been concluded, and due to the
fact that China is imposing its own set of controls on exports that
contribute to ballistic missile programs, we have been able to make this
decision to waive sanctions that otherwise would have been required
against Chinese entities; therefore, we have decided to resume discussions
on the launch agreement and to resume the normal processing of commercial
space licenses involving China.
"Now, that doesn't require US approval for any specific exports to
China. All applications for these export licenses continue to be
subject to case-by-case review on the merits of the individual
license. They also remain subject to normal requirements for
technology transfer restrictions and other things like that. But we
will simply be lifting the suspension that has been imposed and return to
a case-by-case review.
"This has taken place in the past where US-made satellites have been
launched on Chinese boosters subject to rigorous technology safeguards
that are administered by the Department of Defense. And so companies
can apply to us to have their satellites launched on Chinese rockets,
basically.
"Chinese exports of missile technology is a problem that we've dealt
with here. The relation to satellite launches, yes, there were, I
think, several companies that were being looked at for the way they had
handled the technology safeguards that are required. Those issues
continue. Obviously our licensing takes into account any legal
issues that are related to the specific companies. Those aspects are
not affected by the new arrangements with China.
"Whether American companies will be allowed to deal with China again
for satellite launches would depend on a specific case-by-case
review. I don't have a blanket approval of all licenses or of any
specific company's license. That will depend on the specific
applications and how we see the situation. With regard to the
company, it's the legal situation as well as its ability to apply the
required technology safeguards.
"Proliferation is a broad area. But certainly on the missile issue we
think that this takes care of the need for China to have a system to
control exports that contribute to ballistic missile programs. They
are instituting a comprehensive set of controls. We think that's
important and we welcome that; and, in return, we're waiving sanctions.
But as I've stressed, I think several times, the key to this is going to
be implementation and making sure that implementation is thorough and that
all Chinese entities, be they government-associated or not, adhere to
this, and that the system works. So I'm sure there will be
individual instances that we might raise from time to time in order to
make sure that these rules are fully implemented.
"The goal here is not to put somebody on the hook or off the hook;
the goal here is to end sales of missiles and missile-related
components. If we can stop a program, if we can stop exports of
missiles, technology, equipment, parts, whatever, that have been
contributing to the development of ballistic missile capabilities around
the world, and particularly in places like Iran and Pakistan which are
dangerous enough already, it is very important to us to be able to stop
those sales and stop that assistance.
"So that is the goal, and we have succeeded in that goal in working
out with China arrangements for China to put in place a very comprehensive
set of controls on missile sales and exports. And that is what
really matters, that is what we have been working on for many years, and
that is what we have achieved.
"We are prepared to discuss with Pakistan the conditions under which
a waiver on the Pakistani entities might be warranted, but there is also
no basis for waiving the sanctions against Iranian entities.
"As far as Indians, in terms of what the Indians think or have to do
with this, I think you would need to ask the Indian Government. We
certainly believe that the Indian Government would agree with our
determination that Chinese entities have made missile-related transfers to
Pakistan. We believe that India should welcome the comprehensive and
explicit assurances that China has given that no such cooperation will
take place in the future."
Testifying before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence after India's announcement of its decision to invite
Gen.Pervez Musharraf to India for talks, Mr.George Tenet, Director of the
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), said that Pakistan's development of
the two-stage Shaheen II medium-range ballistic missiles would require
additional assistance from Beijing. "The US is closely monitoring for
any sign of Chinese entities providing assistance to Islamabad's venture.
"
He recalled China's commitment of November 21,2000, and
added: ''Based on what we know about China's past proliferation behaviour,
United States is watching and analysing carefully for any sign that
Chinese entities may be acting against that commitment".
Before the visit of Gen. (retd) Colin Powell, US
Secretary of State, to Beijing in the last week of July,2001, for talks
with President Jiang Zemin and other Chinese leaders, the "Washington
Post" carried a report from its correspondent, who had accompanied
Gen.Powell to Hanoi for the ASEAN meeting, stating that the US had
formally protested against continued Chinese export of missiles and
related technology to Pakistan despite last November's commitment.
The report quoted Gen.Powell as saying:"Since
November, we have been following closely and discussing the issue
(proliferation of missile technology to Pakistan) with them, and the
results are mixed. We'll discuss where we think there has been a
satisfactory response and where we think more action is required. Yes,
proliferation will come up, it will be discussed."
The report added that the US had lodged formal protests
and asked for information from China about the alleged sales and that
China had denied it was selling the weapons, but so far had not responded
to US complaints and requests for clarifications from the Foreign
Ministry.
The report pointed out that in the past the US and China
had concluded 15 formal non-proliferation pledges (writer's comment: None
of which was observed by Beijing) and added that, according to US
diplomats, after the November 2000 deal, China continued to export
missiles and missile-related technology to Pakistan. "After November
2000, there have been instances that make the agreement meaningless and
show China has no intention of implementing it," said a diplomat who
had been briefed about China's alleged violations. This may also be linked
to Richard Armitage's critical remarks against Pakistan in recent
interviews. So far, the Chinese had not acknowledged the sales, the paper
said.
The report further said that according to US analysts, a
central difficulty was that influential parts of China's Government were
not convinced that stopping missile sales would benefit China's security
and that the US rejected China's linking the issue with US-Taiwan defence
relations.
Reports from Beijing on Gen.Powell's talks with the
Chinese leaders on July 28 stated as follows:
* He announced that a bilateral experts committee would
meet later this year to work through the issue. "I think we moved
the ball forward. There are still some outstanding issues to be resolved
and places where we don't have full agreement," he said.
* China strongly denied US allegations that Beijing
had violated its agreement with the US by proliferating missiles
technology to Pakistan, saying, "China keeps its word."
However, China insisted that it should be allowed to fulfil contracts
signed before the November 2000 agreement.
* Gen. Powell specifically rejected that argument and
"made clear that no one should think there's an
out."."There are still some outstanding issues to be resolved
and some places where we don't have full agreement," Gen.Powell was
quoted as saying after his meeting with his Chinese counterpart.
"The US might refuse to allow US-made satellites to be launched in
China as a result." However, he said that China agreed to consult
the US experts as it worked to establish a clear set of regulations
governing the export of missile technology. China has been promising to
publish such regulations for years.
* Gen.Powelll said that he raised "specific
transfers" of missiles and technology , but declined to say which
sales concerned him most. Previously, administration officials had said
they were most concerned about sales of missile components to Pakistan.
* A senior (unnamed) State Department official said
the administration did not expect rapid changes in China's practices:
"No one believes you will change the behavior of 100 million
bureaucrats." He further said the Bush Administration would press
for specific actions when the dialogue resumed.
After the return of Gen.Powell to Washington, the
"Washington Times" carried reports on August 6 and 7,2001,
giving the following details of the Chinese violations of the November
21,2000, pledge as detected by the US intelligence agencies:
* The China National Machinery & Equipment Import
& Export Corporation sent a dozen shipments of missile components to
Pakistan since November,2000, and a US spy satellite detected the latest
shipment as it arrived by truck at the mountainous Chinese-Pakistani
border May 1,2001. The company supplied components for Pakistan's
Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-2 missile programmes. The consignments were sent
by ship and truck.
* The missile components are being used for production
of the Shaheen-1, which has an estimated range of 465 miles, and the
development of the Shaheen-2, which US intelligence agencies think will
have a range of up to 1,240 miles.
* "The problem is serious," a senior
administration official was quoted as saying. The arms transfers could
lead to the imposition of economic sanctions required under US
proliferation laws. "We're looking at that now."
* "They have not met the conditions (specified by
the US)," the unnamed official was quoted as saying. China also has
failed to draw up an export-control regime that could prevent state-run
companies such as CMEC from selling missile parts.
* China, for its part, is demanding that the Bush
Administration relax export controls on US satellites being launched on
Chinese rockets, in exchange for curbing its arms transfers, the
official said.
In his daily press briefing on August 6,2001, Mr.Richard
Boucher, the State Department spokesman, said as follows:
* "We are closely watching the issue."
Washington would try to design a system of missile export controls
through "expert talks" with Beijing. The goal of those talks
would be to improve Beijing's "mixed results" in implementing
the November, 2000, pledge. "That is certainly not our preferred
course (imposing sanctions against China), although we would certainly
follow US law if it came to that."
* "But first and foremost, what we want to see is
that the Chinese abide by the [November] agreement and implement their
new system of controls effectively." Washington hoped to start the
talks in time so that they could "produce resolution" before
Mr.Bush's visit to China in October.
* "We look forward to expert talks where we can
get together with the Chinese, hear from them what they've done, what
they are doing, and hear from them about some of the specific
transactions that have caused concern." He declined to comment
specifically on the "Washington Times" report that a state-run
Chinese company had sent a dozen shipments of missile components to
Pakistan.
* Washington had been "watching very closely the
issue of Chinese missile transfers" and expected Beijing to abide
by the November deal. "We intend to do our part of that agreement
if we know that the Chinese are doing their part."
In a statement issued at Beijing on August 8,2001,the
China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corporation (CMEC)
claimed that it had never exported or provided missile components to
Pakistan. It contended that the CMEC's business scope was mainly confined
to the contracting of international engineering projects, and export of
machinery and electrical products and complete plants. Since its founding,
the CMEC had always operated strictly within the bounds of law and the
business scope approved by the state and had never exported or provided
any military equipment, arms or related components to Pakistan or any
other country, it claimed further. It added that the CMEC had never used
trucks as a means of transportation for cross-border exports.
Refuting the "Washington Times" report on
August 9,2001, the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Office urged the US
to remove the artificial barriers on satellite exports to China and to
bring the satellite launching services between the two countries back to
the normal track. She claimed that China had all along been implementing
its non-proliferation policy in a serious, earnest and responsible
approach and accused some newspapers in the US of frequently spreading
"irresponsible and totally unfounded rumours" and slanders of
China engaging in proliferation, which was entirely driven by
"ulterior motives."
She added that the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery vehicles had an impact on international
peace and security, and all countries had the obligation to strictly
observe the relevant international legal instruments. "If any country
adopts a selective approach to these legal instruments, it will only
undermine the international non-proliferation efforts. It is even more
inadvisable to spread irresponsible remarks based on so-called
`intelligence' that is fabricated out of thin air in an attempt to exert
pressure on other countries."
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For
Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: [email protected]
)
