South Asia Analysis Group 


Paper no. 298

20. 08. 2001

  

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MUSHARRAF VS LT.GEN. MOHAMMED AZIZ

by B.Raman

There are indications of fresh tension in the relations between Gen.Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's self-reinstated Chief of the Army Staff, self-styled Chief Executive and self-promoted President, and Lt.Gen.Mohammed Aziz, a Corps Commander at Lahore, who is also the clandestine Chief of Staff of Pakistan's Army of Islam consisting of Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) and the Al Badr. 

The tension has arisen over what Lt.Gen.Aziz, a member of the Sudhan tribe from Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), and some of the Punjabi and Pakhtoon Generals view as Musharraf's amenability to pressure from the US on issues such as:

* the easing out from the nuclear establishment of scientists suspected by the US to be in touch with and helping states of concern such as North Korea, Iraq and Libya in nuclear and missile matters;

* co-ordinated action against bin Laden and Mullah Mohammed Omer, the Kandahar-based Amir of the Taliban;

* action against other terrorist/jehadi groups operating from Pakistani and Afghan territories;

* exercising restraint on jehadi groups operating against India in order to facilitate a negotiated settlement of the bilateral differences; and

* allowing the CIA to have a more active Taliban-focussed role from Pakistan.

Unlike the previous Clinton Administration, the present Bush Jr Administration has been following a nuanced carrot and stick policy towards the military junta in Islamabad.  One could discern the contours of this new policy---- from the benign neglect of the Clinton Administration to calibrated re-engagement---- in the statements and discussions of Mrs.Christina Rocca, the US Assistant Secretary of State in charge of South Asia, during her visit to Lahore, Islamabad and Peshawar earlier this month.

The components of the carrot are as follows:

* Nostalgic recall of the good old days when Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the USA's CIA and the Armed Forces of the two countries acted in tandem--overtly and covertly--in a joint crusade against the erstwhile USSR.

* Support for Pakistan's economic reforms and continued US abstention when proposals for assistance to Pakistan come up before the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other multilateral organisations so that the proposals go through.

* Expression of concern over the lack of clarity in Musharraf's Road-map for the restoration of democracy ("All roads lead to Musharraf"), but assurances that this would not come in the way of continued multilateral assistance to Pakistan.

* Reiteration of difficulties in lifting bilateral economic and military sanctions so long as democracy is not restored, but assurances of finding ways, within the limits of the sanctions, of helping Pakistani civil society for humanitarian purposes and strengthening the roots of democracy and the non-governmental movements on various issues and case-by-case waivers for the supply of spare parts and fresh equipment for Pakistani Army contingents deployed with UN peace-keeping forces abroad (e.g. the recent case of the Pakistani troops in Sierra Leone ).

The stick has the following components:

* The appointment of Mrs. Wendy Chamberlin, a former CIA operative of Laos fame and an expert on narco-terrorism, as Ambassador to Pakistan, to co-ordinate the efforts to monitor the activities of bin Laden, the Taliban and the various narco-terrorist groups operating from the region as jehadi organisations.  She started her CIA career as a teacher in Vientiane in Laos in 1973 during the Vietnam war and taught at the Dong Dok University in Vientiane.  She worked under the over-all supervision of Mr.Richard Armitage, the present Deputy Secretary of State, who was then a CIA operative posted in the office of the US Defence Attache in the US Embassy in Saigon.  She developed a wide network of contacts amongst the Meos, Hmongs and other mountain tribes of Laos who were used by the CIA in its covert actions against the Communist Pathet Lao.  After completing her teaching assignment, she ostensibly joined the US Foreign Service and was posted to the US Embassy in Vientiane from 1976 to 1978.  During this period, Mr.Armitage, after a cover resignation from the CIA, worked for some private companies of the CIA, which were being used by it for covert actions against the Communists in Indo-China.  She returned to Vientiane as US Ambassador in 1996 and continued till 1998 when she was posted in Washington DC as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in charge of narcotics affairs.  She was actively involved in the execution of "Operation Immunity II" against narcotics smugglers from Mexico.  "Through our worldwide counter narcotics program, and by working closely with our friends and colleagues in the law enforcement community we plan to win the fight against drugs," she said after taking over.  She is coming to Islamabad with the same determination to bring bin Laden, the Amir of the Taliban and other narco-terrorists, Pakistan and Afghanistan-based, to justice.

* The proposed posting of a team of UN monitors on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to monitor the effective implementation of the UN sanctions against the Taliban, particularly the arms embargo.  US intelligence agencies and non-governmental organisations such as the Human Rights Watch have been repeatedly warning the US Administration that the military junta in Islamabad, while claiming to be enforcing the sanctions, continues to clandestinely assist the Taliban, economically as well as militarily.  There is a likelihood that as was the case with the UN inspection team in Iraq, the proposed team in Pakistan too might consist of a number of intelligence operatives from the US, the European Union countries and even Russia so that they can explore the possibility of covert actions directed against bin Laden and the Taliban Amir.  Conservative Think Tanks such as the Heritage Foundation, which are close to the Republican Party, have been telling the Bush Jr Administration that vital US interests are involved in this region and that these could be protected only by having the Taliban removed from power; the removal of bin Laden alone will not do.  This perception has been strengthened after the arrest by the Taliban of some voluntary humanitarian workers from the US, Germany and Australia on a charge of preaching Christianity and its refusal to let the diplomats of these countries meet the arrested workers.

* Pressure on Islamabad to co-operate with the CIA in its operations against bin Laden and the Taliban, with veiled threats that the evidence of Pakistan's complicity with them available with the US intelligence should be sufficient to declare Pakistan a State-sponsor of international terrorism.

The Army of Islam group led by Lt.Gen Aziz had even earlier been unhappy and concerned over Musharraf's visit to India and over his speech on the Holy Prophet's birthday criticising the Islamic fundamentalist groups.  They suspected and continue to suspect that Musharraf's visit to India was preceded by clandestine back channel contacts through the intermediary of the US.  They also suspect that Musharraf has been playing a double game.  They think that while ostensibly praising and defending the jehadi groups as "freedom-fighters", he has been secretly assuring the US that he would ultimately rein them in once his economic reforms started producing results.

They similarly suspect that while holding in public that Pakistan has no role to play in the USA's disputes with the Taliban, Musharraf is inclined to clandestinely assist the US.

To pre-empt his moves and to put him on the defensive, this group has taken the following actions:

* Planting a story on "Paktoday", a US-based Pakistani website (http://www.paktoday.com/ ), on August 10,2001, about the role allegedly played by Dr.Naveed Musharraf, the Chicago-based brother of Pervez Musharraf, in the back channel contacts, which preceded the Agra summit, during which the General was reported to have promised to rein in the jehadi organisations as a quid pro quo for certain steps to be taken by India.  This report titled "Musharraf Was Ready To Surrender Jehad" has not so far been picked up by any Pakistani newspaper for fear of annoying the General.

* Planting a story by Kamran Khan, the investigative journalist, in the "News" about the US pressure on the bin Laden and the Taliban issues.

* Sending instructions to the Amir of the Taliban to hold on to the voluntary workers and to resist any pressure on this issue from Musharraf through Lt.Gen.Moinudeen Haider, the Mohajir Interior Minister.

* Instigating the Islamic organisations to oppose the stationing of UN monitors in Pakistani territory.

* Advising the jehadi organisations to step up their activities not only in J&K, but also in other parts of India.

The present battle of wits between Musharraf and his Mohajir coterie on the one side and the Army of Islam group on the other reminds one of a similar battle of wits between Mr.Nawaz Sharif on the one side and Musharraf and Aziz on the other during and after the Kargil conflict.  It may be recalled that:

* To embarrass Nawaz and to put him on the defensive, Musharraf and Aziz got planted in the Pakistan press stories about the role played by Lt.Gen.Ziauddin, the then DG of the ISI, in the arrest and harassment of Mr.Najam Sethi, the Editor of the "Friday Times" and about the back channel contacts between Nawaz and Mr.A.B.Vajpayee, the Indian Prime Minister, at the height of the Kargil conflict.

* When Nawaz sent Lt.Gen.Ziauddin to Kandahar to pressurise the Taliban Amir to co-operate with the US on the bin Laden issue and to act against the Sunni extremists taking sanctuary in Afghanistan, Musharraf sent Aziz to Kandahar to tell the Amir to disregard the instructions of Ziauddin.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: [email protected]

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