CHINESE ESPIONAGE IN US
by B.Raman
The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)
submitted to the Congress on August 3,2001, a special report on its
activities during the period from January 6,1999, to December 15, 2000.
The report, inter alia, contains the following comments on Chinese
espionage in the US: (Writer's comment: The asterisks in the report seem
to indicate that certain portions have been deleted by the Committee)
"In the 105th Congress (Writer's comment: the
present Congress is the 107th ), the Committee (the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence ) unanimously approved Terms of Reference
for investigations into "Impacts to U.S. National Security of Advanced
Satellite Technology Exports to the People's Republic of China (PRC)'' and
"The PRC's Efforts to Influence U.S. Policy.''
"These investigations were prompted by (1) press
reports of possible export control law violations by Loral Space and
Communications Ltd. and Hughes Electronics Corporation, in the course of
launching U.S. satellites on Chinese rockets that may have harmed U.S.
national security by providing expertise to the PRC's military ballistic
missile programs, and (2) a report that Johnny Chung, a Democratic Party
fund-raiser, being investigated for improprieties during the 1996
presidential campaign, told Department of Justice investigators that an
executive with a PRC aerospace company gave him $300,000 to donate to
President Clinton's 1996 re-election campaign. The latter report came
against a backdrop of earlier reporting and prior congressional
investigations of a PRC Government plan to influence the American
political process.
"Subsequent investigations and press reporting
identified additional problems in the course of U.S. satellite launches in
the PRC, which were first authorized under a policy dating to the Reagan
Administration, designed to address the shortage of space launch
capabilities following the Challenger disaster. These problems included
Hughes' transfer to the PRC of a failure analysis of the 1995 launch of
the Hughes Apstar 2 satellite, and the absence of U.S. Government monitors
at Chinese launches of three Hughes satellites in 1995-1996.
"Other press reports raised concerns that the PRC
may have developed technology applicable to Multiple Independently
Retargetable Vehicles (MIRVs) through its development, to U.S.
specifications, of a multiple-satellite "Smart Dispenser'' to place
Motorola "Iridium'' communication satellites in orbit.
"In the course of its investigations, which
concluded in May 1999, the Committee conducted ten hearings and dozens of
staff briefings and interviews. Witnesses included the Director of Central
Intelligence George Tenet, Attorney General Janet Reno, FBI Director Louis
Freeh, and expert witnesses from the CIA, the Defense Department's Defense
Technology Security Administration (DTSA), the Department of State, the
National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC), the NSA, the DIA, and the General
Accounting Office (GAO). Committee staff also reviewed tens of thousands
of documents provided by Executive departments and agencies and U.S.
satellite manufacturers, and produced analyses for the Committee's use
based on those documents.
"In a Committee Report approved on May 5, 1999, by
a vote of 16 to one, the Committee found, with respect to satellite and
missile technology transfers, that: The technical information transferred
during satellite launch campaigns enables the PRC to improve its present
and future space launch vehicles and ICBMS. Because such analyses and
methodologies are also applicable to the development of other missile
systems, the Committee believes that, where practicable, the PRC will use
the transferred information to improve its short range ballistic missiles
(SRBMs), intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), and related
technology. These missiles could threaten U.S. forces stationed in Japan
and Korea, as well as allies in the region.
"* * * * * * * The Committee's conclusions with
respect to technology transfer are based on the evidence of technology
transfers to the PRC's space launch industry * * * the substantial
similarities between space launch vehicles and ballistic missile
technology (the CIA has described space launch vehicles as ballistic
missiles in disguise), the integration of the PRC's space launch and
ballistic missile industries, the PRC's intention to modernize and upgrade
its ballistic missile force, evidence that U.S. know-how was incorporated
into the PRC space launch program, and the Committee's assumption that any
improvements in the PRC's space launch vehicles would be incorporated
wherever practicable in the PRC's military ballistic missile program. * *
* * * *
" * In the past, the PRC has proliferated SRBMs,
IPBMs, and their related technology to potential U.S. adversaries such as
Iran and to countries such as Pakistan where the presence of advanced
weapons increases regional instability. U.S. national security interests
already may have been harmed if the PRC used the transferred information
to improve these proliferated missile systems. Or U.S. national security
may be harmed in the future if the PRC proliferates missile systems or
components that have been improved as a result of the technology transfer.
"The Committee further finds that improvements to
the PRC's space launch capability increases the PRC's ability to use space
for military reconnaissance, communications, and meteorology. The PRC's
enhanced ability to use space in turn may pose challenges to U.S. national
security interests and capabilities. The perfection of a flight-worthy PRC
Smart Dispenser is an example of the pulling effect leading to improved
space launch services inherent in U.S. use of such services. The PRC had
indigenous capability to develop a Smart Dispenser prior to Motorola's
request for proposals for the Iridium project. Undertaking this project
resulted in a flight-worthy dispenser. Analysts differ as to the military
significance of this development.
"The Committee found that decisions in 1992 and
1996 transferring licensing jurisdiction over commercial satellites from
the State Department to the Commerce Department emphasized commercial
interests over national security and other concerns. The 1992 decision
shifted jurisdiction over the export of commercial satellites without
militarily significant characteristics from the State Department to the
Commerce Department. This action reduced the ability of the State and
Defense Departments to block such exports on national security grounds.
"* * * In 1996, jurisdiction over the export of all
remaining commercial satellites was transferred to Commerce. The 1996
decision had the additional consequence of completing the process of
removing commercial satellites from categories of goods that would not be
exported when the U.S. government imposed Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) Category II sanctions. This step, at least in part,
reflected industry pressure since 1992 to bring about such a policy
change.
"* * * * * * * The transfer of the export of
commercial satellites to Commerce Department jurisdiction affected U.S.
national security. Some believe the national security was enhanced by
having the PRC use U.S. satellites and by maintaining strong international
demand for our satellites. On the other hand, some believe this step
diminished the impact of U.S. sanctions against the PRC for its
proliferation practices, thus weakening the non-proliferation regime
generally.
"The Committee identified a failure by successive
Administrations to provide adequate funds, staff, and training to DTSA
officials responsible for monitoring U.S.-PRC satellite cooperation.
As a
result of confusion engendered by the 1992 decision, Defense Department
monitors were not present during three satellite launch campaigns in
1993-96. Existing documents show that no monitors were present in 1997 at
the fourth technical interchange meeting of the Chinastar 1 campaign.
Records suggest, but do not confirm, the absence of monitors at other
meetings. The Committee believes these unmonitored meetings provided the
PRC opportunities to collect technical information. The Committee would be
surprised if the PRC did not take advantage of such opportunities to
obtain technology.
"The Committee recommends substantial changes in
the launch monitor program. From 1988 through today, the Intelligence
Community has generated and disseminated to U.S. policymakers extensive
intelligence reporting on issues relevant to export policy decisions.
Such
reporting covers the PRC's interest in obtaining advanced U.S.
technologies, the integration of the PRC's civilian and military launch
vehicle programs, PRC military modernization, and PRC missile
proliferation.
"The Committee found that intelligence reporting
dating from at least the 1980s indicated that the PRC Government has had a
strategic, coordinated effort to collect technological products and
information from the U.S. Government and private companies. According to
intelligence reporting, the PRC Government had devoted significant
resources and effort at collecting all types of technology from American
sources, whether of military or commercial value or both.
"Although intelligence reports detailing widespread
and organized PRC efforts to collect technical knowledge were available to
officials involved with the satellite export program, weaknesses in
procedures and insufficient resources to support the monitoring effort
detracted from the overall program. The Committee concludes that U.S.
Government officials failed to take seriously enough the
counterintelligence threat during satellite launch campaigns. As a result,
monitors were inadequately trained and rewarded and of insufficient
number. An inadequate effort was made to ensure that employees of U.S.
satellite manufacturers were trained and prepared to deal with PRC efforts
to obtain U.S. know-how.
"With respect to PRC efforts to influence U.S.
policy, the Committee focused on the following question: "Is there
intelligence information that substantiates the allegation that the PRC
government undertook a covert program to influence the political process
in the United States through political donations, and other means, during
the 1996 election cycle?''
-----------------------------------------------------------
"The answer to that question, the Committee
concluded, was: Yes. * * * [Whereas] historically, the PRC government has
focused entirely on influencing the U.S. President and other Executive
branch officials * * * after the Taiwanese President, Lee Tung-hui, was
granted a visa to the United States in 1995, PRC officials decided that it
was necessary to reassess their relationship with Congress. In response to
President Lee's visit, the PRC conceived of a plan to influence the U.S.
political process favorably toward that country. The plan was an official
PRC plan, and funds were made available for its implementation. The
existence of this plan is substantiated by the body of evidence reviewed
by the Committee, including intelligence reports.
"
-------------------------------------------------------- While the primary
focus of the PRC plan was the U.S. Congress, the Committee discovered no
direct evidence or information of an actual attempt to influence a
particular member of Congress. However, the PRC plan to influence the U.S.
political process applied to various political office holders or
candidates at the local, state, and federal level. There is intelligence
information indicating PRC officials provided funds to U.S.. political
campaigns. However, the intelligence information is inconclusive as to
whether the contributions were part of the overall China Plan.
"During a criminal investigation into violations of
the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Johnny Chung, a U.S. citizen and
a subject of that investigation, stated that in August 1996 he had been
given $300,000 by a senior PRC official to assist in the election of
President Clinton. While this statement is contrary to his previous
statements, the FBI can trace only about $20,000 of the $300,000 to the
Democratic National Committee, via a contribution by Chung. Most of the
remaining funds went for his personal use, including mortgage payments.
"There is also reporting regarding contributions
from other sources made to a Republican candidate for state office and a
Republican state office holder. There is no intelligence information
indicating that contributions had any influence on U.S. policy or the U.S.
political process or that any recipients knew the contributions were from
a foreign source. The intermediary between Johnny Chung and the senior PRC
official was Ms. Liu Chao-ying, daughter of General Liu Hua-qing, formerly
the highest ranking military officer in the PRC"
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies,
Chennai. E-mail: [email protected] )
