FROM AGRA TO NEW YORK
by B.Raman
Gen.Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's self-reinstated Chief
of the Army Staff (COAS), self-styled Chief Executive and self-promoted
President, came to Agra in July for his first summit with Shri
A.B.Vajpayee, our Prime Minister, with two predominant impressions in his
mind, namely:
* Battle fatigue has set in amongst the Indian Security
Forces, which have started pressurising our Prime Minister to try for a
negotiated settlement of the Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) issue.
* Our Prime Minister is coming round to realising what
the Pakistanis like to think as the unstoppable momentum of the proxy
war being waged in J&K by Pakistan through the jehadis and has
started looking for an honourable exit from J&K. The
comparison, which invariably came to the mind of the Pakistani military
junta in this regard was Afghanistan in 1988 and Mr.Mikhail Gorbachev.
His carefully calculated negotiating strategy of
"Kashmir, Kashmir and Kashmir, nothing but Kashmir" was the
outcome of these impressions.
At the delegation level talks in Agra, which followed
the tete-a-tete between Musharraf and our Prime Minister, Shri Vajpayee
tried to strongly disabuse the mind of the General of these
impressions. Despite this, from the way the summit took place and
from what Musharraf perceives as our over-anxiety to cultivate him, he has
gone back to Pakistan with these impressions further strengthened.
From the way he was lionised at New Delhi and Agra by
large sections of public opinion and the media, he has gone back to
Pakistan with a third impression, namely, that growing sections of public
opinion in India are also getting tired of the proxy war and are keen for
an honourable exit and that he has an objective ally in them.
He made full use of the media opportunities provided by
us to him to project himself not only to Indian, but also to global public
opinion as a lucid-thinking, reasonable, forward-looking man unlike the
Indian leadership, which is in a dilemma as to how to go forward in
dealing with the proxy war and the J&K issue.
In Pakistani perception, Musharraf won the first round
of the battle of wits with our Prime Minister, with the gains for him
being:
* Greater acceptability at home and better public image
of him in the US and other Western countries.
* The already discernible trend in governmental
(particularly the Pentagon), Congressional and non-Governmental circles
in Washington DC towards a more benign attitude vis-a-vis the military
junta, while maintaining theirs pro forma criticism of the overthrow of
democracy in 1999. This attitude is already reflected in the
gathering pressure for a simultaneous lifting of the post-1998 sanctions
against India and Pakistan.
After his return to Islamabad from Agra, Musharraf has
initiated action against the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a Sunni terrorist
organisation, and the Sipah Mohammed, a Shia organisation which came up to
counter the Lashkar. The activities of the latter were confined to
Pakistan, while those of the former, to Pakistan and Afghanistan, where it
is a close ally of the Taliban.
Neither of these organisations is active in
J&K. Musharraf made a pretense of also acting against the open
activities of the jehadi organisations in Pakistani territory,
particularly in Sindh, but has since called them off. These were
essentially tactical moves with an eye on the forthcoming expiry of the
IMF's stand-by credit programme on September 30.
He and his junta have convinced themselves that it is
these jehadis, who, through their activities in J&K, have forced India
to accord him acceptability and status and to come to the negotiating
table without any pre-conditions. Thus, they are not in a mood to
rein in the jehadis. Their strategy is: "Let blood keep flowing
in J & K till the talks lead to a solution acceptable to
Pakistan."
September is an important month for him in his efforts
to persuade the IMF to extend the stand-by credit for one more year and to
accord, in addition or in lieu of the credit, low-interest loans under its
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (Amount sought: US $ two
billion). The chances of his success with the IMF would depend on
the attitude of the US, which, in November last, abstained in the vote in
the IMF on the stand-by credit thereby ensuring its passage.
During her visit to Pakistan end-July/beginning August,
Mrs.Christina Rocca, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of South Asia,
reportedly assured him of continued US abstention, if not support, during
future votes too and indicated that the Bush Administration was thinking
of resuming bilateral assistance meant to strengthen the civil society and
the democratic process, but not military-related assistance.
The military junta, despite its strong public criticism
of the recent US sanctions against its missile establishment for the
import of Chinese missile components and technology, is not unduly worried
over them. Many entities of the Pakistani nuclear and missile
establishments have been under similar sanctions for months now, but there
has been no effect on them since none of these entities has a formal trade
and other technology exchange relationship with any entity in the US.
Thus, Musharraf would be going to New York for his
forthcoming second summit with our Prime Minister with greater confidence
in his wisdom and in the political support enjoyed by him at home and
abroad post-Agra, in his ability to negotiate hard with our Prime
Minister, in his mastery of media management and in his consequent ability
to mould perceptions in his favour to the detriment of India and our Prime
Minister and with renewed conviction that if he stuck to his present
strategy of "talk,talk, kill,kill", it is only a question of
time before Indian and international opinion would force the Indian
leadership to let go at least the Valley, if not Jammu and Ladakh.
His negotiating strategy at New York would continue to
be based on the following components:
* The centrality of the J&K issue and the secondary
importance of other issues.
* Willingness to discuss other issues so long as
primacy is to the Kashmir issue.
* Progress on other issues to be tied to that on the
Kashmir issue.
* Without a solution of the Kashmir issue,
confidence-building measures do not make sense.
* Willing to discuss terrorism as a general, academic
issue, but not the proxy war in Kashmir and the activities of the
jehadis in specific terms.
* No question of Pakistan ever accepting a final
solution based on the recognition of the LOC as the international
border.
* Any solution has to be acceptable to the Kashmiri
public opinion, meaning the Hurriyat.
* The only flexibility he would be prepared to show is
in respect of a UN-sponsored plebiscite. He would be prepared to
consider any other mutually-acceptable method for ascertaining the
wishes of the Kashmiris, provided it is acceptable to the Kashmiris.
* Will not harp on the UN resolutions provided India
stops harping on the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore accord.
The Pakistani officials have already started
arrangements for a media blitz in the US and for a tour by him of
important US cities to mobilise the non-resident Pakistanis for countering
the influence of the pro-India lobbies.
He has reportedly given up his original plans for a
stop-over in Cuba lest it be misunderstood in the US.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For
Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: [email protected]
)
