UNITED STATES: POWELL�S VISIT TO SOUTH ASIA - MORE MISGIVINGS
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
United States Secretary of State, General Colin Powell�s highly
publicised Visit to South Asia took place from October 14 to October 17,
2001. This was his first official visit to South Asia after the
advent of the Bush Administration. In normal course, such a visit
would have been termed and viewed as an exploratory visit.
General Powell�s first visit to South Asia has taken place against
the backdrop of extraordinary circumstances, namely Islamic Jehad wreaking
unprecedented vengeance on Fortress America itself. The events of
September 11, 2001 portend that no longer can the United States isolate or
insulate itself from global terrorism and certainly not from the
globalisation of Islamic Jehad.
The United States, consequently, can no longer afford to be selective
in terms of its alliances and coalitions to deal with globalised Islamic
Jehad. Nor can the United States afford to categorise its coalition
partners into tactical allies and strategic allies.
General Powell�s visit to South Asia stands covered by the media in
great detail, both in terms of what he said and what he didn�t say
either in Pakistan or India. This paper would avoid a repetition of
the coverage and instead dwell on a few of the basic issues emerging from
this visit.
Pakistan and India as Coalition Partners of United States Global
Coalition Against Terrorism?: The United States would be in a state of
self-delusion if it views that Pakistan and India can act concertedly as
coalition partners of the United States global coalition against
terrorism. The United States has to appreciate that the
contradictions in South Asia, arising from Pakistan�s obsession with the
two nation theory, run deep, embedded as they are in historical and
civilisational differences.
India despite the brave talk of being �natural allies� stands faced
post-September 11 with a Machiavellian twist in the South Asian policies
of the United States. Indians, if not the Indian Government, are
aghast at the United States degenerating its noble crusade against Islamic
Jehadi terrorism with an unholy alliance with the centre of gravity of
Islamic Jehad, namely Pakistan.
Pakistan�s renewed alliance with the United Stats, the arch-enemy of
Islamic Jehad does not surprise anyone. Pakistan, historically, has
acted as the handmaiden of any external intrusive power in South Asia.
General Powell�s visit is in a way has been unable to bridge the
irreconcilable contradictions between the perceived coalition partners of
the United States.
United States tilt towards Pakistan- the reasons are unconvincing:
General Powell has been tying himself into knots defending the
post-September 11 United States tilt towards Pakistan. The
predominant projection before General Powell�s visit to South Asia had
been that the United States needed Pakistan�s cooperation and assistance
to prosecute its counter terrorism operations in Afghanistan. It was
also stressed that this American requirement was tactical in nature, both
operationally and time-wise.
General Powell�s standing with General Musharraf at the joint press
conference in Islamabad laid great stress on: (1) United States enduring
commitment to Pakistan; (2) Commencement of a strengthened US-Pak
relationship (3) Pakistan as a great Muslim nation.
It stands discussed in my earlier papers, that the United States
military strategic blue-print in Afghanistan did not require Pakistani
assistance or cooperation for any �blitzkrieg� against the Taliban.
Multiple alternative options were available.
September 11, provided a justifiable excuse for a strong lobby within
the US State Dept. to resuscitate Pakistan, once again as a
front-line state in US strategy. The indicators were there before
September 11. (Refer paper "United States Reverses Gears in South
Asia" www.saag.org/papers4/paper303.html
) The moot question is: front line state against whom in the South West
Asian or South Asia context? India perforce, would have to take notice of
this tilt in United State policies. Historically there are
precedents of such tilts in US policies, independent of what US Presidents
may think.
General Powell offered no convincing arguments to justify this tilt in
his press conference in India.
Strategic versus Tactical relationships of the Bush Administration:
General Powell with his vast military experience should know that in any
campaign, strategy and tactics are interlinked. If he was alluding
to relationships in terms of time spans, i.e., a short term relationship
with Pakistan related to Afghanistan and a long term relationship with
India, then his Islamabad statements contradict this claim.
General Powell, if he was alluding to Pakistan�s role in the regional
context and India�s role in the global context, then should have made
this emphatic in Islamabad. Pakistan would however not accept such
an equation.
General Powell did not make these equations clear during his South Asia
visit.
Powell�s ill-advised references to Kashmir: The professed aim of
General Powell�s visit to South Asia was to find out as to how Pakistan
and India could more effectively contribute to the American
counter-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan.
Kashmir is not the central issue related in any way or manner to the
American counter terrorism campaign in Afghanistan. In the current
context General Powell could have avoided all references to Kashmir.
While, his references to Kashmir in Islamabad may have assured America�s
tactical ally in South Asia, it sullied the atmospherics of his next day�s
visit to its strategic coalition partner. His contentions in Islamabad led to instant official
rebuttals in New Delhi. Powell�s subsequent refuge in
"articles" of English language did not undo his loss of
credibility in India by treading on Indian sensitivity.
Retrieving Powell from embarrassments: The joint press conferences
in Islamabad and New Delhi during General Powell�s visit were studies in
contrast and therefore invite comments.
In Islamabad the irony was of two generals underscoring Pakistan�s
foreign policies and relationships. Protocol wise Pakistan�s
foreign minister should have participated.
What was striking in the New Delhi joint press conference was that
while correct protocol was adhered to, it was India�s Foreign minister
Jaswant Singh who was at pains to retrieve General Powell from many
embarrassing questions, especially those relating to Kashmir. The
lesson from the above for General Powell in relation to US South Asian
policies are (1) India respects US sensitivity but has an
independent mind. (2) India will co-opt for US led initiatives but cannot
be expected to be a collusive side kick.
Conclusion: Gen. Powell�s visit to South Asia can only be termed
as pointless exercises. The points that were sought to be addressed
were left unaddressed. It left more misgivings in South Asia that
were existent before his visit.
In Pakistan, no amount of assurances, economic aid not withstanding can
alter the fanatic Islamic fundamentalism that prevails in the masses and
rank and file of the army. Pakistan has not conceded any more
assistance to USA than was initially done i.e. Use of air space, logistics
support and intelligence sharing. On the contrary what was being
emphatically projected to Powell can only distort US military strategy in
Afghanistan. Powell stood enlightened by a new term in Pakistan�s
terrorism vocabulary "moderate Taliban."
In India, while the responses may have been muted to Gen. Powell�s
insensitive pronouncements on Kashmir in Islamabad and lack of
condemnation of Pakistani state-sponsored terrorism, these muted responses
do not hide the disappointment of Indians with current American policies
post September 11.
(Dr. Subhash Kapila is an International Relations and
Strategic Affairs analyst. He can be reached on e-mail for
discussion at [email protected])
